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1 General Introduction 
A friend of ours from the world of high finance always says that the 
poor are like hedge-fund managers – they live with huge amounts of 
risk. […] In fact, he grossly understates the case: No hedge-fund 
manager is liable for 100 percent of his losses, unlike almost every 
small business owner and small farmer.  
    (Banerjee and Duflo, 2012, p. 134f) 
Drought events in different parts of the world create impressive images and attract 
the attention of the media, politicians and the public on the vulnerability of 
livelihoods in agrarian economies of least developed countries (LDC). While images 
of dried up landscapes, perished animals and undernourished humans are an 
effective instrument to create public awareness, they are usually the most extreme 
manifestation of rainfall risks. But even if the magnitude of realized rainfall volatility 
is smaller, it does not mean that income related to agriculture was secure. As the 
agricultural activity of small-scale farmers in LDCs is mostly rainfed, the correct 
timing and amount of seasonal rainfalls is of decisive importance for crop yields and 
income generating activities linked to harvest amounts. Thus, even comparably 
small deviations in rainfall realizations or in the timing of cyclical rainfalls may 
induce income losses although they neither have the potential to create shocking 
images and news nor to attract public awareness or to trigger relief payments or 
charity events.  
During the years 2008-09 and the global food price crisis, the developed world 
learned about a new source of income risks, when outraged people revolted against 
rising food prices, for instance in Bangladesh, Somalia, Egypt or Senegal. Several 
people got injured or even killed when overstressed governments intervened in 
protests and riots against rising staple food prices. While the reasons for increasing 
prices are still subject to ongoing discussions, the consequences were particularly 
felt by the poorest parts of the population who saw their incomes getting 
devaluated. Moreover, as agricultural input prices for seeds and fertilizer rose at the 
same time, farmers had to economize, releasing millions of day laborers into 
unemployment or forcing them to accept wage cuts (Banerjee and Duflo, 2012). 
Food price variability and increasing food prices impact on the food security 
situation of households in a negative way. The term food security has been defined 
by the World Food Summit in 1996 in the following way:  
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Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and 
economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their 
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. 
    
                         (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2006) 
 
Food security comprises different dimensions such as food availability, food 
utilization, food stability and food access. The first dimension of food security covers 
the aspect of physical availability of food, which is ensured by domestic production, 
imports or even food aid. While the utilization dimension of food security is 
concerned with other food related components such as access to clean water, 
sanitation and health care, food prices increases and rainfall variability are 
particular threats to the stability and access dimension of food security. Food 
security is only reached if every household has permanent access to sufficient 
amounts of food and micronutrients. However, if food prices are variable and 
increase for any reason, this may exclude certain households from consuming 
sufficient amounts of food and micronutrients and thus violates the above given 
definition of food security. Rainfall shocks and their effect on agricultural production 
are a threat to the stability as well as the availability dimension. Lacking rainfall has 
the potential to destroy crops and harvests but may also have an effect on food 
prices if the supply of food decreases in the aftermath of a rainfall shock. Thus, 
protesting individuals in countries with rising food prices saw their food security 
situation to degrade.  
These perspectives on two risk types of the recent past illustrate the fragility of 
livelihoods in LDCs in general. Furthermore, they illustrate the constant need to 
manage the risks of low income households in LDCs every day, even if risk 
realizations are not that severe that they attract public attention or relief payments. 
Hence, this dissertation is aimed to shed light on the position of low income “hedge-
fund managers” and the two dimensions of possible risk management decisions 
taken by them: informal and formal practices. Confronted with lacking public safety 
nets, imperfect access to capital markets and weak institutions but also pronounced 
income risks, informal risk management is at the center of risk provision. From a 
farmer’s perspective this could mean to plant a variety of differently drought-prone 
crops or to split up labor time over different income generating activities, i.e. 
farming and supplying time to labor markets. Informal risk management may also 
comprise selling assets, strategic migration or school dropouts of dependents. For 
most of these strategies, disadvantages outweigh advantages: Diversifying the set of 
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crops planted could mean to lower the production risk but at the same time to lower 
the expected yield and thus income. In this perspective, production risk may 
contribute to the chronification of poverty as producers may be trapped in “low risk-
low yield” production plans. A similar criticism is made towards asset-based 
strategies such as selling assets in times of distress or taking children out of school: 
Depleting a household’s capital stock or decreasing the investment into it decreases 
future earning possibilities and may thus also lead to perpetuating poverty 
structures. In addition, asset based income smoothing turns out to be ineffective 
when the number of households willing to sell assets during times of distress is high 
while the number of asset-buying counterparts is low. This creates a downward 
pressure on asset prices and deteriorates their income smoothing power. With 
respect to labor time allocation, splitting up the labor time potential may mean to 
decrease the degree of specialization and, as it will be argued in chapter 2, changes 
the composition of income risk when consumption prices are uncertain and volatile 
while the overall income risk decreases less than expected. 
The weaknesses and potentially negative side effects of informal risk management 
have triggered the development of formal risk transfer instruments such as 
microinsurance. In a first attempt to define the term microinsurance, Churchill 
(2006) writes: 
Microinsurance is the protection of low-income people against specific 
perils in exchange for regular premium payments proportionate to the 
likelihood and cost of the risk involved. This definition is essentially 
the same as one might use for regular insurance except for the clearly 
prescribed target market: low-income people. How poor do people 
have to be for their insurance protection to be considered micro? The 
answer varies by country, but generally microinsurance is for persons 
ignored by mainstream commercial and social insurance schemes, 
persons who have not had access to appropriate products. 
   (Churchill, 2006, p. 12) 
 
Although this definition has been elaborated and broadened in the meantime 
(Churchill and McCord, 2012), it clearly shows the similarities with conventional 
insurance. As premiums and conditions are also adapted to the target group, 
underwriting and claims settlement processes have to be designed in the most cost 
effective way to guarantee the affordability for the target group of low income 
households.  
In the attempt to insure systemic income risks in agrarian economics in a cost 
effective way, risk transfer markets have seen the development of index-based 
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microinsurance products. While microinsurance policies resemble conventional 
insurance products in particular with respect to the determination of indemnity 
payments, index based microinsurance works differently. Its main characteristic is 
that indemnity payments are not contingent on on-site damage and loss 
assessments but rather they are triggered when predefined threshold levels of non-
influenceable index variables were exceeded. For instance, an index-based drought 
insurance policy would trigger indemnity payments to insured farmers only 
whenever the amount of rainfall at a predefined rainfall gauge in a predefined 
period of time was below the rainfall threshold at which healthy crop growth is 
sufficiently likely. This indirect loss assessment reduces moral hazard incentives as 
well as it allows insurers to insure a large set of households in a cost effective way. 
However, the particularities in product design raise other issues. For instance, it is 
widely reported that the demand for these products stays behind expectations and 
that lacking demand can be explained by –among others– skepticism about the 
product but also by product inherent characteristics (Awel and Azomahou, 2015, 
Karlan et al., 2014, Cole et al., 2013, Norton et al., 2011, Hill and Robles, 2011, Giné 
et al., 2010, Giné and Yang, 2009).  
Hence, the structure of this dissertation should be straightforward: In order to 
assess the magnitude of rainfall and food price volatility induced income variability, 
Chapter 2 will review empirical evidence on induced welfare effects by the two risk 
types. Household level outcomes will be categorized along the measurement 
variables such as income changes, effects on poverty measures or consumption 
changes. The analysis has no specific geographical focus. However, as the 
dissertation is on formal and informal risk management in LDCs, studies from 
developing and emerging countries in south-east Asia, Latin and South America as 
well as Africa have been selected for the review. In a second step, evidence on the 
extent of informal risk management strategies with a particular emphasis on labor 
related strategies will be reviewed. This means that the evidence on informal 
adaptations using child labor, the coping power of labor markets and consumption 
responses will constitute the main analysis elements in the risk coping section.  
In chapter 3, informal risk management practices with a particular emphasis on 
labor time allocation stand in the focus of the analysis. It is argued that splitting up 
the labor time potential over different income generating activities to cope with 
rainfall variability does not lower the overall income risk to the extent which an 
household had hoped for. This argumentation is mainly linked to the observation 
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that consumption prices for staple foods are variable and rainfall patterns are not 
completely predictable. Hence when households split up their labor time potential, 
they diversify their rainfall induced production risk. Due to food price variability, 
these households tap into a purchasing power risk if their wage income is 
devaluated by increasing food prices. Hence, if rainfall and food price variability are 
imperfectly correlated, the overall income risk decreases by splitting up the labor 
time potential. However, the diversification effect is reduced due to food price 
volatility and the resulting purchasing power risk. Using a household data set from 
India, it will then be tested to which extent the labor time allocation depends on the 
magnitude of income risks, i.e. food price and rainfall variability. 
In chapter 4, the relation between informal and formal risk provision will be tested. 
By using demand data for an index-based drought insurance product from India, the 
demand function for the product will be estimated subject to the degree of informal 
risk management, again modelled by the degree of labor time allocation. It is 
hypothesized that the degree of informal risk management provides a certain degree 
of informal income protection. Hence, those who have a more diversified income 
portfolio and perceive relatively higher income shares from non-rainfall dependent 
activities have a lower incentive to buy an insurance product which insures them 
against rainfall variability. Hence, it is empirically tested whether the degree of 
informal risk management has a negative effect on formal insurance demand such 
that informal and formal risk management strategies stand in concurrence to each 
other. Chapter 5 will conclude the dissertation with a general summary. 
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2 Risk and risk coping in least developed countries: A review 
of drought and food price risk effects 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Many studies in the recent past have been published to quantify poverty 
effects of realized income risk such as drought events or the consequences of 
the recent global food price crisis. As agrarian economies in least developed 
countries heavily depend on the correct onset and amount of rainfall 
quantities, lack of rainfall is likely to have adverse consequences for 
household income and its volatility. In addition, agrarian households in least 
developed countries are mostly net food consumers and thus highly 
dependent on the realization of food prices. This study reviews the empirical 
evidence on adverse income effects of drought events and food price 
increases as well as it summarizes the risk management and coping 
strategies directly linked to these two shock types. A particular emphasis 
will be given to the stabilizing power of labor markets and adaptation 
through consumption responses.     
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2.1 Introduction 
Risk is an omnipresent phenomenon in agrarian economies. Rainfed production is 
constantly threatened by rainfall variability such as lacking or excessive rainfall. In a 
perfect theoretical world with universal access to capital and insurance markets, 
households would be able to trade their income risks and could thereby flatten their 
consumption profiles. As capital markets in developing and emerging countries, 
however, are marked by unequal access and imperfection, transferring risks is not 
always possible. In the light of this complication, households are forced to manage 
their risks using informal and formal strategies. Some of them are applied in an ex 
ante manner, some of are used to cope with the risks ex post. The riskiness in 
income profiles is not only induced by rainfall variability. Agricultural outputs are 
marketed at goods markets to use the profit for consumption purposes. As most 
producers are also net buyers of staple foods, price changes for agricultural goods 
are likely to affect their position as a seller but also as a consumer of food (Minten 
and Barrett, 2008, Poulton et al., 2006).  
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. With regards to the first, empirical studies 
that quantify welfare effects induced by drought events as well as potential welfare 
effects from changing yet increasing food prices are reviewed. The second aim of the 
study is to review studies that address the informal risk management decisions of 
households, aimed to mitigate the income shocks induced by drought and food price 
shock events. In order to address the second purpose of the study, the main 
emphasis will be on the risk mitigating power of labor markets, drawing on studies 
estimating the extent to which labor time allocation but also the extent to which 
child labor is used to cope with shock events. The review leaves out studies 
considering welfare effects induced by climate change induced gradual losses. The 
reasoning for that is that climate change impacts on weather patterns in two ways: 
First, it makes extreme weather events more likely and also more frequent. Second, 
climate change also contributes to long lasting changes for instance increasing 
average temperatures. The review, however, draws on risks that are potentially 
insurable on a competitive insurance market to research a household’s decision 
between informal and formal risk management and coping activities. Climate change 
induced gradual risks and losses are uninsurable by any kind of insurance policy 
supplied by competitive insurance markets. Hence, even though households have to 
deal with gradual losses, they do not induce a rivalry between informal and formal 
risk management as only informal activity is available in this case.  
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Risk and risk coping in developing and emerging countries as well as coping 
strategies were subject to previous survey articles. Dercon (2002) uses a broader 
risk notion by including idiosyncratic as well as systemic risks into the review. He 
also reviews evidence with respect to the effectiveness of informal risk management 
strategies. He concludes that the effectiveness of an applied strategy will depend on 
the shock character, on the ability to bear entry costs of these strategies as well as 
on the income position held prior to shock materialization. 
Dorward (2012) provides an overview of theoretical and empirical papers to assess 
the impact of changing food prices for consumers and producers in developing and 
emerging countries. His main insights are that increasing staple prices had 
heterogeneous effects for different types of market participants. All in all, poor 
urban and rural net buyers of food were the ones most affected by rising food prices 
while he negates the hypothesis of positive second round effects, i.e. through rising 
wages or adapted production plans. Heterogeneity in food price increase effects is 
also driven by the degree of price transmissions from international into domestic 
markets where he concludes that some countries are better shielded than others.  
As there was a significant development in the literature on quantifying welfare 
effects of surging food prices and consumption responses as well as on child labor 
responses after 2012, it is appropriate to systematize studies dealing with these 
aspects of risk and informal risk management in developing and emerging countries. 
Nevertheless, studies published before 2012 will also be included to show the 
evolution in the argumentation. The search algorithm for studies included in this 
review considered mostly empirical papers published since the year 2000 in peer-
reviewed journals while the impact factor of a respective journal was not a choice 
criterion. A backward search has been applied by working through the references of 
a respective paper while forward search has been conducted using the citation 
function of Google Scholar. Other bibliographic databases have not been included in 
the literature study. There was no explicit geographical focus except for the fact that 
only studies on developing and emerging countries in Latin and South America, 
Africa and Southeast Asia were included in the review.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 2.2, studies quantifying income 
effects from drought events and food price shocks will be reviewed and 
systematized according to the variable welfare changes have been measured with. 
Section 2.3 will review studies estimating the impact of food price volatility on 
household welfare measures. In section 2.4, risk management as well as coping 
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strategies will be reviewed with a particular focus on labor market related strategies 
and approaches. Section 2.5 will conclude and wrap up the main insights and 
implications. 
 
2.2 Impact of rainfall induced shocks on households 
The following section will review empirical studies quantifying the extent of 
systemic shocks on outcomes at the household or macroeconomic level. Systemic 
shocks comprise rainfall induced shocks such as droughts or flood events. 
Furthermore, systemic shocks will also comprise potential income effects induced 
by food price volatility. Effects from shock events at the household level were 
measured in different outcome variables such as income and expenditure effects and 
changes of the latter, poverty measures such as poverty threshold or headcount 
estimations and measures of food security.  
 
2.2.1 Rainfall risk induced expenditure effects  
Many scholars attempt welfare effects from weather disturbances by measuring 
their effect on consumption, consumption growth or expenditures. This review 
distinguishes between expenditure and income effects, although these two 
measures are closely related. However, the quantification of expenditure effects 
reveals redistribution of expenditures which is of interest and will therefore be 
separated from pure income effects.  
Dercon (2004) analyses the effect of drought shocks on consumption growth using a 
panel data set comprising the period from 1989 to 1997 in six villages in rural 
Ethiopia. Almost all individuals in the sample have access to land and therefore 
depend on agriculture and rainfall outcomes. He finds that a 10% decrease in 
rainfalls leads to a reduction of food consumption growth of about 5 % and 
equivalently to a 3% reduction in total consumption. 
The magnitude of shocks is not uniformly distributed among population groups and 
may change in sociodemographic but also geographical variables (Skoufias and 
Vinha, 2013, Skoufias et al., 2012, Dercon et al., 2005). According to Dercon et al. 
(2005), drought shocks reduce per capita consumption – including food and non-
food items – by about 19 % on average. By further disseminating shock effects 
according to household characteristics, they find that female-headed households 
experience a 43 % decrease in per capita consumption while male-headed 
households cut per capita consumption levels by about 10 %. In addition, 
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households with low head of household education levels experience a 20 % 
reduction in per capita consumption while households with better educated head of 
households incur a 14 % reduction in the same number. It is questionable whether 
this finding represents a causal relationship. However, it seems to be reasonable 
that more educated households have more abilities to spread their labor force to 
employment besides agriculture. In consequence, better educated households may 
have a less rain sensitive income portfolio. Skoufias and Vinha (2013) find that the 
protection of consumption levels depends crucially on the geographical location of 
the respective household: Households living in dry areas are less able to protect 
their consumption from rainfall and temperature shocks compared to individuals 
living in sub-humid and humid areas of the country. In addition, it is crucial at which 
point in the agricultural year a rain or temperature anomaly has been experienced.  
The study of Skoufias et al. (2012) analyzes the effect of rainfall shocks on total real 
per capita expenditures on food and non-food components in Indonesia. In their 
sample, rice is the primary production good and susceptible to variations in rainfall. 
They model rainfall shocks as the difference in days after which cumulative rainfalls 
exceed 20 mm after August 1 of a respective year and the day when the critical 
threshold has typically been reached. This is what the authors call ‘onset’ of the 
monsoon. The main result is that an onset delay of one standard deviation reduces 
real per capita food expenditures by about 13 %. By further differentiating the 
analysis, they find that specialized rice farmers suffer even more from rainfall 
variability: An increase in the severity of a post-onset drought reduces the non-food 
expenditures of rice farmers by 25 % whereas food expenditures decrease 
insignificantly. Skoufias et al. (2012) conclude that rice farmers are able to protect 
food consumption by decreasing the level of non-food expenditures. 
Other studies find that that the magnitude of income drops depends on the severity 
of rainfall shocks, such as Porter (2012) by analyzing a sample from the Ethiopian 
Rural Household Survey. She finds that real household monthly consumption             
–including food and non-food items– dropped between 7 and 25 % for villages 
where actual rainfalls were in the bottom quintile of the 30-year rainfall 
distribution, compared to villages where actual rainfall was in the third quintile. 
Arouri et al. (2015) assess the impact of floods and droughts on households using a 
panel data set from Vietnam. Their major variables of interest were per capita 
income and per capita expenditures. Using a community level fixed-effect model, 
they found that the occurrence of a drought reduces per capita income by about 6 %, 
22 
 
whereas a flood reduces the same by about 5 %. A similar effect size is found with 
respect to per capita expenditures which decreased by around 4 % following a flood 
or drought event.  
Other scholars draw research on potential shock mitigating effects induced by public 
assistance programs. Hill and Porter (2017) conduct an analysis on the consumption 
effects of droughts and other kinds of shocks in Ethiopia. They use two waves of 
rural household surveys from the years 2005 and 2011, containing information on 
self-reported idiosyncratic shocks by the households surveyed whereas information 
on covariate shocks were exogenously collected and matched according to the 
geographical reference of the respective households. The authors estimate a 
consumption function, where the total expenditures on food and non-food per adult 
equivalent have been used as the dependent variable. Drought damages were 
measured in the proportion of crops lost using the Livelihoods, Early Assessment 
and Protection forecasts. It is found that a 10 % increase in crops lost leads to a 3 % 
reduction in adult equivalent consumption levels of the households under study. 
This number decreased slightly to 2 % if the household was supported by the 
Productive Safety Net Program, introduced in 2005. The authors explain the small 
difference between the two groups of households by the fact that the 2011 drought 
in Ethiopia was comparably less severe than other drought events. 
 
2.2.2 Rainfall risk induced income effects 
The previous section presented empirical evidence for rainfall shocks impacting on 
expenditure structures of households. The following section will review the 
evidence of rainfall shock induced income effects.  
Molua (2011) explores the effect of weather uncertainty on expected farm profits in 
Cameroon, differentiating for potential gender related effects with respect to farm 
ownership. Rainfall uncertainty decreases expected profits of both male and female 
owned farms. However, female owned farms are more strongly affected by rainfall 
variations, which decrease expected farm profits by up to 15 % while male owned 
farms see their profits to decrease by up to 14 %. At the same time, the author finds 
that rainfall variability increases the farm profit variability by up to 38 % for female 
and up to 31 % for male owned farms.   
Porter (2012) further analysis the impact of rainfall shocks on crop income. In her 
sample, the average crop income share is relatively high. In 2004, 66 % of household 
income stems from selling crops. Consequently, if actual rainfall levels were in the 
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bottom quintile of the 30-year rainfall distribution, this reduced crop income by     
17 % compared to farmers residing in villages where actual rainfall fell in the third 
quintile of the long-term rainfall distribution. 
As growing and selling crops is the most important income source in most of the 
developing countries, production is not only susceptible to changes in rainfall levels 
but also with respect to temperature variability. Thiede and Gray (2017) look into 
the effects induced by temperature anomalies and delayed onset of the monsoon on 
the composition of household incomes. The study uses data from the Indonesian 
Family Life Survey (IFLS) of the waves 2000 and 2007-08, containing individuals 
from 15 to 49 years of age. Income data was collected during the 12 months prior to 
each survey. A marginal deviation of the long-term temperature mean results in a 
1.67 units decrease in farm profits, whereas farm profits stay unaffected from a 
delay in the onset of monsoon rainfalls. The same result holds for other income 
sources such as non-farm business revenues or non-agricultural labor.  
Generally, it is found that the strength of the income effect may also be affected by 
socio-demographic variables. This result was also found when the variable of 
interest was household expenditures. However, the magnitude of income cuts seems 
to be more pronounced than expenditure cuts, emphasizing the importance of 
expenditure reallocation as a risk coping strategy. 
While the majority of scholars were concerned with the microeconomic outcomes of 
rainfall variability, there is also evidence on the macroeconomic level. Pandey et al. 
(2007) use a cross-country study to estimate the economic costs 0F1 induced by a 
drought for southern China, eastern India and northeast Thailand. They find that 
India is hit hardest by drought events with economic costs amounting to $856 
million per drought event and $85 and $133 million for Thailand and China 
respectively. The authors further estimated that drought events resulted in a         
24-58 % reduction in overall income, where average crop income reduced from 
$600 in normal years to $90 in drought years in Chattisgarh, in northeastern India 
for instance. 
 
                                                             
1 Pandey et al. (2007) use a broad notion of economic cost including direct costs such as 
losses in harvest amounts but also opportunity costs that arise due to a loss in specialization 
induced by informal risk management of drought risks.  
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2.2.3 Rainfall risk induced food security effects 
A different approach to measure the impact from rainfall variability on household 
outcomes is to look at measures of food security or malnutrition as a consequence of 
shocks. Considering measures of food security allows analyzing the intra-household 
distribution of food during periods of distress. For instance, Hoddinott and Kinsey 
(2001) explore the effect of a drought on child growth in Zimbabwe. They use 
growth rates of child height and regress them on structural and shock variables. 
Their main insight is that a drought experience slows down the child growth rate in 
particular for children aged between 12 and 24 months at the time of drought 
occurrence.  
Support for malnutrition induced causality is found by their robustness analysis 
which finds that the reduction in child growth is smaller among asset rich compared 
to asset poor families. Thus, they provide evidence that rainfall shortages translate 
into declining provision of adequate food and nutrients. Several studies find a 
positive relationship between child growth and subsequent outcomes, i.e. taller 
adults earn more in later years (Schultz, 2003, Thomas and Strauss, 1997). Thus, 
drought experiences in younger years may have long lasting effects on future 
earnings and poverty outcomes.     
Generoso (2015) estimates the probability of switching between different 
categories of food security depending on the occurrence of inter-annual rainfall 
fluctuations. Households are matched to the different food security categories by 
rating the dietary diversity and economic access to food. Using a household survey 
from Mali, he finds that an increase in the inter-annual rainfall variability increases 
the likelihood to switch from the highest to the lowest food security-category by 
about 38 % in the Sahelian zone of Mali. The effect is less pronounced in the 
Sudanian zone where the switching probability amounts to 20 % for an increase in 
the inter-annual rainfall variability.  
There are also studies emphasizing a relationship between drought events and 
health outcomes where the moderating effect may be found in nutrition (Bauer and 
Mburu, 2017, Grace et al., 2012). These studies will be reviewed in the risk coping 
section 2.4.1. 
Thus, the studies cited in the previous passage indicate that drought events have 
devastating effects on food security. However, it also shows that the household food 
security situation degrades and the effect of redistribution of food within a 
household is less pronounced. As it will be shown in a subsequent part, this 
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conclusion will change when considering the effects of food price volatility on food 
security. 
2.3 Impact of food price volatility shocks on households 
As a next step of the review, studies and evidence on potential welfare effects of food 
price shocks will be reviewed. As in the preceding parts, the review focus will be on 
quantifying the effects of changing food prices with regards to different outcome 
variables.  
The adverse effects of rising and volatile food prices received broader attention with 
the emergence of the global food price crisis in the years 2007-08 where global food 
prices reached all-time highs in several LDCs. Price increases were a phenomenon 
before but food price increases peaked in the years 2007-08. As the subsequent 
systematic review will show, the welfare effects are not as clear-cut as with respect 
to drought influences.  
As low-income households are producer and consumer of staple foods at the same 
time, it will be important to judge whether the positive impacts of price increases 
from a producer perspective outweigh the negative effects from a price increase 
from a consumer perspective (Ivanic and Martin, 2008). Conventional wisdom 
suggests that the impact of a transitory food price shock is limited as long as 
households have access to assets, insurance markets and credit (cf. Alem and 
Söderbom, 2012). As this is not globally fulfilled, households may suffer 
heterogeneously from food price shocks.   
2.3.1 Food price volatility induced poverty effects 
In a first step, studies using poverty measures as their variable of interest will be 
reviewed. Poverty measures used in the reviewed studies are poverty head count 
ratios, poverty deficit measures or poverty threshold measures. 
Dessus et al. (2008) focus on poverty effects of increasing food prices by calculating 
the amount of money necessary to raise incomes of affected households above the 
poverty line. This monetary amount is phrased as the poverty deficit (PD). As the 
authors are concentrating on urban poor net sellers of food, income increases due to 
increasing food prices can be excluded from the analysis. Their sample comprises 
household data from 72 LDCs. Their main finding is that the PD ranges from 0.2 to 
2.8 of a respective countries’ gross domestic product (GDP). However, they 
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emphasize that the majority of costs stems from a growing poverty deficit of those 
who were below the poverty line even before the price shock.      
Benson et al. (2008) asses the vulnerability of Ugandan households towards changes 
in food prices. They find that the majority of Ugandan households can be considered 
as net buyers of food and are thus primarily negatively affected by food price 
increases. On the economy level, Uganda is able to provide most of the consumed 
foods internally and does not rely on international imports of staples. Thus, the 
country can shield its population fairly well from food price rises at international 
markets. However, Uganda has to import large shares of maize consumed, thus 
households consuming maize are facing struggles with price rises. Hence, the study 
concludes that in particular the maize consuming households are suffering from 
price increases. 
Haq et al. (2008) analyze the Household Integrated Economic Survey from Pakistan 
to estimate the effect of the global 2007-08 food price crisis on poverty headcount 
ratios. Their main finding is that the headcount ratio raised by about 5.7 percentage 
points among the urban population and 9.3 percentage points among the rural 
population. In absolute terms, 2.3 million additional urban residents and 8 million 
rural residents became poor according to the headcount ratio due to the food price 
crisis.  
Ivanic and Martin (2008) perform a similar analysis and calculate the poverty rate 
effect1F2 and its change for a set of countries in Asia and Africa using price increase 
data from the 2005-07 food price increase in consumption goods prices, when 
consumption prices increased but did not yet reach their historic peak levels. On 
average, they find an increase of poverty rates by about 3 percentage points, with a 
substantial difference between rural and urban populations (2.5 compared to 3.6 
percentage points increase). While countries like Zambia and Nicaragua saw 
massive increases in their poverty rates by up to 10 percentage points, extreme 
poverty reduced in Vietnam, which benefited on average from rice price increases. 
The numbers presented above are first-round effects, neglecting for instance wage 
rate adaptations in reaction to price increases. Similar numbers are being found for 
first-round effects of increasing food prices by Hoyos and Medvedev (2011) who 
conducted a global analysis of rising food prices during the 2005-07 food price 
increases. They conclude that urban households were hit harder by food price 
2 They use the population share of individuals living from less than $1 per day. 
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increases than rural households as urban households would not benefit from the 
increase in agricultural profits but would rather suffer from the loss in purchasing 
power as consumption goods are getting more expensive. According to their 
estimations, the food price increase resulted in 155 million individuals who fell 
below the poverty line of $1.25 per day additionally. The strongest increase took 
place in East Asia and Pacific countries where rural households were more strongly 
affected than urban households.  
Using data from a second price increase in the years 2010-11, Ivanic et al. (2012) 
make a global assessment of poverty measures. They confirm their results from 
their previous study that, with the exception of Vietnam, all of the countries in their 
set suffered from the food price surge and experienced net increases in their poverty 
headcount measures. What should be noted as well is that the food price increase 
led to a redistribution of poverty. This is shown by Ivanic et al. (2012) who find that 
in principle, in all countries there exist population groups which benefited from the 
price increases while others lost welfare measured by the change in the poverty gap. 
The net effect is usually negative ranging from an increase of 0.06 % in Cote d’Ivoire 
to 1.28 % in Bangladesh with the exception of Vietnam where the poverty gap 
declined by 0.19 %.  
Using a simulation study from the Philippines, Fujii (2013) finds that a hypothetical 
10 % increase in all food prices would lead to an increase in the head count poverty 
index of 6.5 percentage points among the rural and 4.5 percentage points among the 
urban population. Hence, this study deviates from the conventional wisdom that 
rural households are on average less affected by food price increases compared to 
urban households. They argue that the share of very poor households is higher 
among the rural compared to the urban population. Hence, those very poor 
households induce a downward bias in the simulation. 
Akter and Basher (2014) estimate the poverty effects of the 2007-08 rice price 
increase in Bangladesh using head count rates. Overall, the poverty head count 
increased from 6 % in 2007 to 21 % in 2010. Mean difference tests in poverty 
growth rates between affected and non-affected households were insignificant, 
hence indicating that food price increase impacts are heterogeneous across the 
groups of affected and non-affected households.   
Most of the above cited studies assume that consumer and producer price levels 
changed proportionally. This assumption has been criticized by Dawe and 
Maltsoglou (2014) who argue that producer and retailer prices neither reflect a 
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similar cost structure nor have market participants the same market power. Hence, 
non-proportional price changes would be evident. Under the assumption of non-
proportional price changes for producers and retailers, Minot and Dewina (2015) 
estimate poverty effects from the 2007-08 food price crisis on urban and rural 
households in Ghana. They find that poverty rates increase. However, the increase is 
rather small as their estimates suggest an increase from 11 % to 11.2 % among 
urban households in the short and long term respectively. In addition, rural 
households will benefit in the long term from rising food prices such that poverty 
rates would decrease from 35 % to 34.9 % under proportional price changes. 
Considering non-proportional producer and retail price changes, the authors 
estimate poverty decreasing effects in the short and long term by up to 2.4 
percentage points among the rural households while the result for the urban 
poverty rates remains unaffected compared to the proportional price change 
assumption.  
Increasing food prices have substantial effects on poverty outcomes in LDCs. At the 
same time, they also contributed to reallocations of welfare and income within a 
country. However, with the exception of Vietnam, the net welfare effect of food price 
variability was negative. 
 
2.3.2 Food price volatility induced food security effects 
Other studies estimated the welfare effects of food price surges using measures of 
household-level food security. Kumar and Quisumbing (2013) estimate the effect of 
the 2007-08 food price crises on Ethiopian households. Their analysis takes into 
account gender-specific effects and also other household characteristics. By 
estimating a linear probability model, they ask households whether they incurred a 
food price shock in the two years preceding the survey. They find that being a net 
buyer of food increases the likelihood to report being negatively affected by a food 
price shock of up to 20 %, although this result may also be driven by other village 
specific fixed effects. In all of their specifications, female headed households are 
more vulnerable than male headed households to suffer from food price shocks. 
Compared to male headed households, female headed households exhibit a 9 % 
higher probability in experiencing a food price shock.   
D'Souza and Jolliffe (2012) estimate the effects of the 2007-08 food price crises in 
Afghanistan using caloric intake and diet diversity as their variables of interest. They 
conclude that it is inappropriate to use caloric intake as a variable of interest to 
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evaluate the consequences of food price shocks as low income households tend to 
vary quality rather than quantity. Stated differently, low income households have 
lower price elasticities in calorie consumption but higher quality demand elasticities 
than high-income households. To quantify the effect, a one percentage point 
increase in wheat prices decreases calorie consumption by about 6 % for the second 
income decile of the income distribution while it decreases caloric intake of about 
38 % for the ninth decile of the income distribution. Regarding the diversity of food 
consumed, a one percentage point increase of wheat prices decreases the diversity 
of food consumed by 25 % for the lowest income decile and 19 % for the highest.    
As the discussion on drought effects has shown, there exist also gender-specific 
effects of food price volatility. Whether there is an effect of intra-household 
reallocation of food –for instance differences between female and male headed 
households– is questionable. Kumar and Quisumbing (2013) report no significant 
differences between food price increase coping strategies between female and male 
headed households, such as cutting served meals. Furthermore, it is found that poor 
households are more likely to trade quantity against quality as there exist minimum 
requirements with respect to caloric intakes. Hence, low income households have to 
decrease the quality of food consumed instead of the quantity, potentially opening 
space for issues such as malnutrition and inadequate food intake among children. 
 
2.3.3 Food price variability: Miscellaneous effects 
Besides measures of food security or poverty effects, there are some studies 
focusing on consumption effects but also classical welfare measures such as the 
compensating variation.  
Caracciolo and Santeramo (2013) estimate the welfare effects of rising food prices 
in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Ghana using the compensating variation. Thus, they 
estimate the amount of money necessary to compensate households for a price 
increase holding the utility level constant. Their main finding is that while in 
Tanzania there are winners and losers of rising food prices, the situation in Ghana 
and Ethiopia is more homogeneous indicating that all groups of households will lose 
welfare after experiencing a food price shock.  
Rodriguez-Takeuchi and Imai (2013) simulate welfare effects of the 2007-08 food 
price surges in Columbia. Their welfare measure is constructed by calculating the 
compensating monetary amount which would be necessary to maintain the pre-
crisis utility level. After adjusting the poverty lines, Rodriguez-Takeuchi and Imai 
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(2013) find that households in the lowest income quintile lost 7.9 % of their welfare 
while individuals in the highest income quintile lost 1.6 % of their welfare, such that 
the food price crisis induced higher burdens for low-income households and 
increased wealth inequality in Colombia.   
Dimova and Gbakou (2013) analyze the effects of rice price changes on consumers 
in Côte d’Ivoire. Their main finding is that the food price increase led to a 
redistribution of income from middle income households in urban areas to poorer 
households in rural areas. The authors argue that rural households could react to 
price increases by a change in their production program while urban consumers 
only felt the consequences of increasing staple foods prices.  
Similar findings are presented by Jacoby (2016) who simulates the welfare effects of 
rising food prices on rural households using household data from India. He finds 
that first round effects of food price increases have negative effects on net-buyers of 
food. Due to production adaptations in reaction to the price increase, households 
adopt their production portfolio such that second round welfare gains outweigh first 
round welfare losses. Consequently, food price increases lead to a redistribution of 
welfare, from net buyers to net sellers. 
Macroeconomic evidence is provided by Combes et al. (2014). The authors use 
consumption as their variable of interest and estimate the impact of food price 
shocks as well as food price volatility on consumption levels and consumption 
growth. Using a sample from several LDCs, their main finding is that food price 
shocks have positive effects on countries whose vulnerability 2F3 for food price shocks 
is low, i.e. because their openness to trade or the degree of imported food is 
relatively low. However, if food price vulnerability is sufficiently high, food price 
shocks decrease the level of per capita consumption as well as it increases the 
variability of consumption growth. 
Table 2-1 will summarize the review on rainfall and food price variability induced 
welfare effects on a glance.  
3 Vulnerability has been measured along several dimensions: Degree of food dependency, 
Food import burden, Share of food imports, Level of GDP per capita relative to other 
countries.  
Table 2-1:  Studies quantifying welfare effects of rainfall and food price variability 
Study Study area 
Observation 
period 
Type of shock(s) 
under 
consideration 
Dependent variable Main results 
Rainfall induced expenditure effects 
Dercon (2004) Ethiopia 1989-1997 Drought 
Consumption 
growth rates 
 10 % rain shortfall leads to a 5 % reduction of 
food consumption growth and to a 3 % 
reduction of overall consumption growth rate 
Dercon et al. (2005) Ethiopia 1999-2004 Drought 
Log of per capita 
consumption 
Experiencing a drought lowers per capita 
consumption by about 19 %  
Skoufias and Vinha 
(2013) 
Mexico 
2002, 
2005/2006 
Rainfall 
variability 
Consumption per 
capita 
The household’s ability to protect its 
consumption from weather shocks depends on 
the climatic region and the timing of shock 
occurence 
Skoufias et al. (2012) Indonesia 2000 
Rainfall 
variability 
Expenditure per 
capita  
Monsoon delay of one standard deviation 
reduces real per capita food expenditures by 
about 13 % 
Porter (2012) Ethiopia 1994-2004 
Rainfall 
variability 
Consumption per 
capita 
Consumption dropped between 7 and 25 % for 
villages where actual rainfalls were in the 
bottom quintile of the 30-year rainfall 
distribution 
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Study Study area 
Observation 
period 
Type of shock(s) 
under 
consideration 
Dependent variable Main results 
Arouri et al. (2015) Vietnam 2004-2010 
Flood and 
Drought 
Consumption and 
expenditure per 
capita  
Expenditures per capita decreased by around 
4 % following a flood or drought event. 
Hill and Porter 
(2017) 
Ethiopia 
2004/2005 
and 
2010/2011 
Rainfall 
variability 
Food and non-food 
expenditures  
10 % percent drought induced crop loss 
results in a 3 % reduction in consumption 
Rainfall risk induced income effects 
Molua (2011) Cameroon NA 
Rainfall 
variability 
Agricultural income 
Marginal increase of weather variability 
reduced expected profits of female (male) 
owned farms by about 15 % (14 %) 
Porter (2012) 
Ethiopia 1994-2004 
Rainfall 
variability 
Agricultural income 
Rainfall levels in the bottom quintile of the 
long-term rainfall distribution lead to a 
reduction in crop income of about 17 % 
Thiede and Gray 
(2017) 
Indonesia 
1993-94, 
1997, 2000, 
2007-08 
Temperature and 
rainfall variability 
Agricultural income 
Marginal deviation from the long-term 
temperature mean results in a 1.67 units 
decrease in farm profits while farm profits are 
insensitive towards Monsoon onset delays 
Pandey et al. (2007) 
China, India 
and 
Thailand 
1970-2002 
Climatic 
(Drought) 
Agricultural income 
Drought events reduce income by about 24-
58%  
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Study Study area 
Observation 
period 
Type of shock(s) 
under 
consideration 
Dependent variable Main results 
Rainfall risk induced food security effects 
Generoso (2015) Mali 2005 
Rainfall 
variability 
Food security index 
Increasing rainfall variability increases the 
likelihood of switching to lower food security 
classes by about 20-38 % 
Hoddinott and 
Kinsey (2001) 
Zimbabwe 1993-1997 Drought Child growth rate 
Children aged 12 to 24 months lose 1.5 ± 2 cm 
of growth in the aftermath of a drought 
Food price volatility induced poverty effects 
Akter and Basher 
(2014) 
Bangladesh 
2006/7-
2009/10 
Food price 
variability 
Poverty head count  
Poverty head count rates increased from 6 to 
21 % 
Dessus et al. (2008) 20 LDC 2005 
Food price 
variability 
Poverty deficit Poverty deficit ranges from 0.2 to 2.8 of GDP 
Haq et al. (2008) Pakistan 2004/05 
Food price 
variability 
Poverty head count 
Headcount ratio raised by about 5.7 
percentage points among the urban 
population and 9.3 percentage points among 
the rural population 
Ivanic and Martin 
(2008) 
9 LDCs 2005-2007 
Food price 
variability 
Poverty rate 
($1/day) 
Increase of poverty rates by about 3 
percentage points on average, Division 
between several countries with increases 
(Nicaragua, Zambia) and reductions (Vietnam) 
in poverty rates 
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Study Study area 
Observation 
period 
Type of shock(s) 
under 
consideration 
Dependent variable Main results 
Food price volatility induced poverty effects (ctd.) 
Hoyos and Medvedev 
(2011) 
76 LDCs 2005-2007 
Food price 
variability 
Poverty rate 
($1.25/day) 
155 million fell below the poverty line due to 
food price increase while the strongest 
increase was observed in east Asia and the 
Pacific states 
Ivanic et al. (2012) 28 LDCs 
June – 
December 
2010 
Food price 
variability 
Poverty headcount 
Poverty gap 
Poverty gap increases in all countries but one 
(0.06 to 1.28 % increase and -0,19 % decrease 
in Vietnam 
Fuji (2013) Philippines 2000-2006 
Food price 
variability 
Poverty head count 
A simulated 10 % increase in food prices 
would lead to a 6.5 (rural) and 4.5 (urban) 
percentage points increase in poverty head 
count 
Minot and Dewina 
(2015) 
Ghana 2005-2006 
Food price 
variability 
Poverty rate 
Under proportional price changes, increase in 
poverty rates by about 0.2 percentage points 
for urban households. Under non-proportional 
price changes reduction in poverty 
Food price volatility induced food security effects  
Kumar and 
Quisumbing (2013)  
Ethiopia 
1994-1997, 
2004, 2009 
Food price 
variability 
Self-reported food 
security 
Being a net food seller increases the likelihood 
of being affected by a negative food price 
shock by 20 % 
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Study Study area 
Observation 
period 
Type of shock(s) 
under 
consideration 
Dependent variable Main results 
Food price volatility induced food security effects (ctd.) 
D’Souza and Jolife 
(2012) 
Afghanistan 2007-2008 
Food price 
variability 
Caloric and diet 
diversity 
A one percentage point price increase 
decreases calorie consumption by about 6 % 
for the second income decile and 38 % for the 
ninth income distribution decile 
Rodriguez-Takeuchi 
and Imai (2013) 
Colombia 2006-2007 
Food price 
variability 
Compensating 
variation 
Households in the lowest income quintile lost 
7.9 % of their welfare while individuals in the 
highest income quintile lost 1.6 % of their 
welfare 
Remarks: Observation periods relate to the observation period for the household level data. The price data may stem from later periods. 
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2.4 Risk management and risk coping 
The last sections were about to review the evidence and literature on effects 
of drought events and food price increases on several household-level 
outcome variables. While drought events were uniformly negative for all 
concerned households, the consequences of food price shocks are more 
fragmented and depend on household and economy fundamentals, geographic 
location as well as whether first or second round effects are taken into 
account. While poor net buyers and in particular poor urban households were 
the ones most affected by food price volatility, food producing rural 
households could benefit from rising food prices due to second round effects 
such as adopting production plans or raising additional labor related income 
due to rising wages. Hence, while drought events lead to a uniform reduction 
of welfare, changing food prices rather lead to redistribution in incomes.  
The next section is particularly concerned with coping strategies of 
households in the context of drought and food price risks. In the literature, 
one finds a multitude of studies identifying several coping and adaption 
strategies. This review, however, will put a focus on the quantification of 
consumption and factor allocation responses as well as on the coping power of 
labor markets.   
2.4.1 Consumption responses 
Several authors address risk coping issues in the context of food price 
variability by estimating demand or consumption elasticities of staple food 
demand. 
Wood et al. (2012) estimate substitution effects for Mexican households in the 
aftermath of the 2007-08 food price crisis during which Mexico suffered from 
a severe increase in maize prices. Surprisingly, their analysis reveals that 
demand elasticities for meat are much smaller than for fruits or vegetables, 
indicating that meat consumption substitution is rather low while fruits and 
vegetables are more likely to be substituted in case of price increases. This 
rather surprising result holds for all population subgroups under study. 
Martuscelli (2016) estimates uncompensated demand and supply elasticities 
of food consumption using household data from Tanzania. He finds that for a 
one percentage point increase in staple food prices, demand for staple food 
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decreases by about 1.14 %. His analysis also shows that the demand elasticity 
is more pronounced than the supply elasticity, differentiating for net-buyers 
and net-sellers of food.   
Other scholars draw on the effect of consumption levels (Yilma et al., 2014, 
Alem and Söderbom, 2012) while others focus more on nutritional diversity 
and quality (D'Souza and Jolliffe, 2014, D'Souza and Jolliffe, 2012) or intra-
household distribution of food (Kumar and Quisumbing, 2013).  
Yilma et al. (2014) analyze coping strategies of Ethiopian households for 
different types of shocks. Experiencing an economic shock, therein included 
drops of output prices, increases the likelihood of reducing food consumption 
by about 24 %. The same probability after experiencing natural shocks –
droughts, floods, storms or earthquakes – equals 40 % on average. Thus, 
cutting food consumption is along with dissaving the most common response 
to these two shock types.   
D'Souza and Jolliffe (2012) estimate the impact of the 2007-08 food price 
crisis on food security measures in Afghanistan during which food prices 
doubled. Food security measures comprise the real value of per capita food 
consumption but also measures of nutritional diversity. Their main finding is 
that a one percent increase in wheat prices leads to a reduction in real per 
capita consumption by about 0.2 %. Moreover, the authors find that 
households reduce their caloric intake from expensive to relatively cheaper 
calories, hence shifting consumption away from meat and vegetables towards 
grains. 
Kumar and Quisumbing (2013) analyze gender specific responses to food 
price shocks for Ethiopian households. The main result is that households cut 
back quality as well as quantity of consumed food in reaction to food price 
shocks. However, the cut back in quality is more pronounced than the cutback 
in quantity, reflecting basic quantity requirements rather than quality 
requirements. In addition, consumption cutbacks mainly occur with adults in 
the households, consumption cutbacks among children are smaller and 
equally distributed between genders.   
Alem and Söderbom (2012) estimate the effect of the 2008 food price surge 
on urban Ethiopian households and assess whether households are differently 
vulnerable towards changes in food prices, measured by their consumption 
reaction. According to the authors, urban Ethiopian households produce little 
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food on their own but spent a high proportion of their income on food 
consumption. The authors asked respondents whether they cut back their 
consumption as a reaction towards food price shocks. Most likely to reporting 
consumption cutbacks are casual worker whose income is rather unsteady. In 
addition, assets are the main driver of preventing households to cutting back 
food consumption.   
Avalos (2016) is concerned with longer lasting consumption pattern changes 
of increasing food prices between 2002 and 2012 differentiating between 
rural and urban Mexican households. According to the authors, general food 
prices rose by about 134 % in the mentioned period. The authors estimate 
budget shares for eight different expenditure categories and predict from 
these estimations the budget share that should show up if Engel’s Law would 
hold. For all categories of households –poor urban and poor rural households- 
observed budget shares for food consumption exceed the predicted ones 
while budget shares for non-necessity goods decreased. This shows that 
households under study significantly changed their consumption patterns in 
reaction to food price increases. Households had to shift more funds towards 
food consumption and they did so by reducing expenditures on health care 
and education. 
Other authors draw on the potential effect of food price volatility and drought 
shocks on child nutrition outcomes as these events lead to a consumption 
response and hence to changes in the nutritional status of children (Arndt et 
al., 2016). Arndt et al. (2016) analyze the impact of increased volatility levels 
in the aftermath of the 2007-08 food price crisis on child nutrition outcomes 
and compare them with periods where food price inflation was lower using 
data from Mozambique. Their main result is that measures of child 
malnutrition were lower during periods of comparably lower food price 
inflation. In addition, they find that rural populations are more severely 
affected by food price inflation compared to urban regions. This may be due to 
the production structure or different chances to raise additional income.  
Generally, it is found that food price changes lead to significant changes in 
consumption patterns by affected households. Not only do households cut 
back the quantity of food consumed, they do it also by substituting low-quality 
against high-quality food. This practice raises concerns about long-lasting 
nutritional deficiencies, in particular among children.  
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The evidence of consumption responses with respect to drought events is 
rather scarce and centers around the question whether consumption streams 
are smoothed by selling assets during times of hardship (cf. Carter and 
Lybbert, 2012, Kazianga and Udry, 2006, Hoddinott, 2006). However, there is 
some recent evidence that drought events may impacting on child health 
outcomes, providing evidence that drought events lead to consumption cuts 
and deteriorating child nutrition (Bauer and Mburu, 2017, Grace et al., 2012). 
Opiyo et al. (2015) report food consumption cuts as a standard risk coping 
instrument among Kenyan pastoralists, applied by almost 60 % of the 
respondents.  
2.4.2 Labor time reallocation 
This section is aimed to review the evidence of risk potentially impacting on 
factor reallocation within the household in reaction to shocks. Particular 
attention is given to labor reallocation decisions made by households.  
Rose (2001) analyses labor time allocation decisions in reaction to drought 
events in rural India. She estimates the likelihood of labor market 
participation of agricultural households and finds that rainfall shocks (ex 
post) as well as rainfall risk (ex ante) increase it. Thus, labor time allocation is 
used to spread the agricultural production risk ex ante and to cope with 
rainfall shocks. In contrast to these results, Kanwar (1999) finds that labor 
market participation may also be negatively affected by rainfall variability. He 
explains this finding by deteriorating labor market conditions following 
negative rainfall shocks. 
The results of Rose (2001) are confirmed by the study of Cameron and 
Worswick (2003) who find evidence that labor supply increases in reaction to 
shock experiences. Using data from the IFLS, the authors test whether 
households smooth income streams using labor time allocation by splitting up 
their labor time potential between farm work and supplying labor. They find 
evidence that after experiencing a crop loss on the family farm, household 
members tend to reallocate labor rather than increasing the overall time 
spend working on the own farm. In particular male family members tend to 
reallocate their labor time potential towards more productive activities than 
farming in reaction to crop loss. 
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This result is supported by Kenjiro (2005) who pursues the question whether 
households are able to cope with systemic shocks better than with 
idiosyncratic shocks. Using data from rural Cambodia, the author finds that in 
reaction to a crop loss shock, earning additional income by increasing or 
reallocating labor time was an often applied yet effective strategy to raise 
further income ex post. Surprisingly, the author finds that households had 
fewer problems to cope with crop loss than with illness as medical 
expenditures require large payments and are indivisible.  
A different approach has been chosen by Menon (2009) and Skoufias et al. 
(2017) who draw on the occupational diversification by estimating the 
probability that a household head and its dependents have the same 
occupation using shock variables as covariates. Menon (2009) uses data from 
Nepal and finds that rainfall uncertainty and the probability that non-head 
members have a differing occupation from the household-head is positively 
related. Thus, there exists evidence that household specialization is sensitive 
towards rainfall variability and that the degree of intra-household  
specialization is lower where rainfall variability is higher. Similar results are 
being found by Skoufias et al. (2017) for India, showing that rainfall variability 
and rainfall outcomes influence the probability of equal occupations in a 
negative way indicating that rainfall variability lead to a diversification of 
income structures. 
Corral and Radchenko (2017) are using a model of spatial correlation between 
households to determine the influence factors of income source 
diversification. While they confirm spatial dependence in occupation choice 
patterns, rainfall variability is another major driver of income source 
diversification. Thus, more variable rainfall levels lead with a higher 
probability to a more diversified income portfolio. 
A different argument is being made by Carter et al. (2007). The study analyzes 
the post-drought asset recovery in Ethiopia. Among other factors, labor 
market access increases the capital accumulation growth rate and is thus 
important for asset protection and recovery in post-disaster periods. 
To summarize, labor markets are an important instrument to cope with 
adverse weather events. They allow households to diversify their income 
portfolio ex ante and to raise additional income in the post-drought period.  
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2.4.3 Child labor and school enrolment 
The previous section looked at factor reallocation as a reaction towards risk 
such as drought induced production risks. However, there are other forms to 
cope with shocks by raising additional income using labor markets. In the 
following section, studies on raising additional income from the production 
potential of children will be reviewed. This coping strategy has two possible 
effects on household income: On the one hand, there might be a direct income 
effect as children are used to increase the labor time potential and thus to 
expand the labor time available to the household. This increase in labor time 
potential can then be used to increase on farm labor input or the supply of 
labor. On the other hand, reallocating children from school into the labor time 
potential releases funds as schooling is linked to direct costs such as schooling 
fees, transportation or the costs of school uniforms (cf. Janvry et al., 2006). Of 
course, using children’s work force and withdrawing them from school 
induces negative effects with respect to human capital formation. This opens 
the discussion of whether microinsurance has the potential to decrease the 
incentive to make use of the child labor force (Landmann and Frölich, 2015).   
Janvry et al. (2006) analyze school enrolment decisions and child labor 
dynamics of Mexican households in the aftermath of droughts and natural 
catastrophes such as hurricanes, floods or plagues. They find that the 
occurrence of natural catastrophes decreases school enrolment by 3.2 
percentage points while school enrolment stays unaffected from drought 
events. The authors explain this observation by arguing that drought events 
are relatively frequent in Mexico. Thus, households adapted to these events ex 
ante and hence need not to react by a decrease in school enrolment. By the 
same token, drought events do not significantly affect child labor decisions but 
rather decrease the burden of child work. This is explained by deteriorating 
labor market conditions in drought phases and an excess supply of adult labor. 
When wages decrease in a surrounding of excess labor, opportunity costs of 
schooling also tend to decrease.  
Other scholars support the finding that child labor is used as a risk coping 
strategy such as Beegle et al. (2006), analyzing household data from Tanzania. 
Following a crop loss, child labor increases in various fixed effects estimated 
specifications. Child labor is particularly distributed towards domestic work 
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or collecting fire wood while the time allocated to farming increases in an 
unsystematic way.  
Gubert and Robilliard (2007) estimate a model of school entrance and drop 
out probabilities using household data from Madagascar. While school 
entrance probabilities are unsystematically affected by rainfall induced 
income shocks, dropout rates are higher when income shocks are negative. 
The study does not analyze where the child labor force is used after dropping 
out of school. 
Focusing on school enrolment in several African and south-east Asian 
countries, Alvi and Dendir (2011) find no evidence of drought events 
impacting on school enrolment. They explain their finding by the equalization 
of the income and substitution effect between falling wages in drought 
conditions and the lack of missing child labor income. These two effects cancel 
out and, according to the authors, are able to explain the observed pattern.  
Zamand and Hyder (2016) analyze the potential effect of droughts and floods 
on school enrolment outcomes in Ethiopia, India, Peru and Vietnam. They test 
the hypothesis that income loss is substituted by child labor and a decreased 
school enrolment rate in the aftermath of a weather induced event. However, 
their results are rather inconclusive across the countries under study. In none 
of the mentioned study regions, school enrolment is affected by the 
occurrence of floods or droughts. However, performance measures of students 
are negatively affected by drought and flood occurrences, indicating that 
students invest less time into learning as their labor force might be needed to 
cope with the shock event. This result holds across all countries under study.   
Shah and Steinberg (2017) concentrate on the relation between drought 
events and human capital formation in rural India. While current and previous 
year rainfall shocks affect measures of acquired human capital, such as math 
scores and reading abilities negatively, school enrolment is only negatively 
affected by the lagged rainfall shock variable. Hence, school dropout rates 
react to drought events with a lag of one year while rainfall shocks of the same 
year do not exert a systematic influence on school dropout rates. However, the 
deteriorating results in math and reading skills imply that drought events lead 
to a decrease in human capital accumulation effort and are thus an indication 
for intra-household reallocation of labor resources.    
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Evidence on the relation between intensity and extent of child labor as a 
coping reaction with respect to food prices is rather scarce. Recent 
contributions to the discussion stem from Frempong and Stadelmann (2017) 
and Hou et al. (2016).  
Frempong and Stadelmann (2017) find significantly positive effects of food 
price shocks on the decision to work as well as on the extent of working for 
Ugandan households. Thus, the study provides evidence that child labor is 
used to cope with the adverse consequences of food price shocks.   
By presenting evidence from Pakistan from the period 2008-10, Hou et al. 
(2016) report that the probability of school enrolment decreases with the 
occurrence of self-reported food price shocks while the likelihood of child 
work increases in the poorest income quantile of the income distribution. 
More objective results are being obtained by regressing school enrolment and 
work decisions on changes of wheat prices where the enrolment and child 
labor pattern persists: While school enrolment decreases, the quantity of child 
labor increases in the poorest income quantile only. In addition the analysis 
shows that girls and rural households are more strongly reacting towards 
changes in food prices in altering their school enrolment and working 
decision. 
2.4.4 Wage reactions 
The previous section reviewed strategies that are aimed to smooth 
consumption in reaction to food price and rainfall shocks. Labor has been 
found to be an important instrument as labor markets could be used to 
increase child labor, to reallocate labor to sectors that are less affected by 
rainfall shocks or to diversify income portfolios prior to realized income 
shocks.  
Another important question which arises in the context of risk coping through 
labor markets is whether wages react to shock events and thus provide 
implicit insurance by adapting wages. For instance, higher food prices could 
lead to higher production incentives and thus to a higher demand for 
agricultural labor, resulting in rising agricultural wages (cf. Lasco et al., 2008). 
In this sense, agricultural workers would receive a food price shock 
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compensation from their employer and thus dispose of an informal insurance 
instrument. 
Jayachandran (2006) develops the argument that productivity shock induced 
wage cuts are greater where labor supply is more inelastic. Inelastic labor 
supply in his analysis is due to lacking opportunities to migrate or to tap 
financial markets by borrowing or depleting savings. Hence, labor markets in 
regions where the population is unlikely to migrate or where financial market 
access is limited will experience a higher variability in agricultural wages after 
experiencing production shocks. Whether labor markets and wages act as 
implicit insurance depends on the elasticity of demand and supply of labor, 
while elasticities are determined by exogenous fundamentals. 
Lasco et al. (2008) look into short- and long-run wage elasticities as a reaction 
towards rice price changes in the Philippines. Their main finding is that there 
is a positive relation between agricultural wages and rice prices, estimating 
short-run wage elasticities between 0.29 and 0.43 and 0.7 and 1 in the long-
run. However, even under the most optimistic simulation, rice price increases 
are compensated after two years at the earliest. 
In a recent assessment, Jacoby (2016) studies wage responses in reaction to 
price changes in rural India. His main finding is that price changes do not 
perfectly translate into changing wages, neither for manual nor for non-
agricultural labor such that it can be concluded that wage responses are rather 
an imperfect implicit insurance for changing food prices. Kaur (2017) finds 
that nominal wages display nominal downward rigidity. Hence, wages 
increase in the case of a positive production shock but they do not adapt 
downwards if a negative production shock occurs. On the one hand, this 
increases the ability of labor markets to smooth income for those who have 
employment. On the other hand, this could also have a negative impact on the 
chances to enter labor markets for those who seek to smooth their income 
profile in the aftermath of a negative rainfall shock and thus are willing to 
enter the labor market. 
This is also the synthesis of the preceding paragraph. Wages do react with 
respect to price changes, but they will do it with a lag of several years and in 
smaller magnitude. Thus, net food consumers perceiving wage income will 
likely see their welfare to decrease when food prices increase.  
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With respect to rainfall induced production shocks, the evidence on factor 
reallocation has shown that labor markets are an often used yet imperfect 
instrument to cope with rainfall shocks as labor market opportunities may 
deteriorate in the aftermath of a shock event (Kanwar, 1999).  
Table 2-2 will summarize the main insights on the risk coping and 
management section on a glance. 
2.5 Conclusions 
The present chapter reviewed recently published empirical literature on the 
quantification of welfare effects induced by rainfall and food price shocks in 
developing and emerging countries. The review systematized the relevant 
literature according to the underlying dependent variables. Variables of 
interest were changes in expenditure patterns, income effects, poverty 
measures such as headcount ratios or poverty thresholds but also effects on 
the food security situation of concerned households. The main insight from 
the drought shock analysis was that they affect households in a relatively 
homogeneous way. In contrast to food price shocks, households always loose 
welfare from drought shock events. However, the magnitude of welfare losses 
may change in dependence of household or geographical fundamentals. In 
contrast, food price shocks lead to a redistribution of welfare rather than to a 
decrease of it as particularly net food selling households benefit from food 
price increases. On the losing side of increasing food prices, most studies 
found poor urban households which have only limited opportunities to adopt 
production plans or to trade quality for quantity of consumed food. Overall 
and for most economies, however, the welfare decreasing effects outweigh 
potential welfare gains. 
The second part of the review was concerned with informal risk management 
strategies of affected households. The analysis focused on labor related 
strategies such as to increase the labor time potential using child labor, to 
reallocate labor between different income generating activities or to use wage 
reactions as a form of implicit insurance. It has been shown that labor is an 
adaptation strategy widely used for risk coping. 
Table 2-2:  Studies on shock response quantification 
Study Study area 
Observation 
period 
Type of shock(s) 
under 
consideration 
Dependent variable Main results 
Consumption responses 
Wood et al. (2012) Mexico 2006 Food price shocks Demand elasticities 
Substitution elasticity for meat is lower than 
for vegetables and fruits, households 
substitute meat for fruit 
Martuscelli (2016) Tanzania 
1991-1994, 
2004 
Food price shocks Demand elasticities 
A one percentage point increase in staple 
food prices decreases demand for staple food 
by 1.14 % 
Yilma et al. (2014) Ethiopia 2011 Price shocks Food consumption 
Experiencing a drop of output prices 
increases the likelihood of reducing food 
consumption by about 24 %. 
D’Souza and Joliffe 
(2012) 
Afghanistan 2007-2008 Food price shocks 
Consumption per 
capita 
A one percent increase in wheat prices leads 
to a reduction in real per capita consumption 
by about 0.2 % 
Kumar and 
Quisumbing (2013) 
Ethiopia 
1994-1997, 
2004, 2009 
Food price shocks 
Consumption per 
capita 
Households cut back quality as well as 
quantity of consumed food, while  cut back in 
quality is more pronounced than the cutback 
in quantity 
Avalos (2016) Mexico 2002-2012 Food price shocks 
Consumption 
budget shares 
Households had to shift more funds towards 
food consumption and they did so by 
reducing expenditures on health care and 
education which changed established budget 
shares of consumption. 
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Study Study area 
Observation 
period 
Type of shock(s) 
under 
consideration 
Dependent variable Main results 
Consumption responses (ctd.) 
Arndt et al. (2016) Mozambique 2008-2009 
Food price 
variability 
Measures of child 
malnutrition 
Measures of child malnutrition were lower 
during periods of comparably lower food 
price inflation and more pronounced in rural 
than urban regions. 
Opiyo et al. (2015) Kenya NA Drought Food consumption 
Almost 60 % of the respondents cut their 
food consumption levels in reaction to 
drought events.  
Labor time reallocation 
Rose (2001) India 1968-1971 
Rainfall 
variability 
Labor market 
participation 
Likelihood of labor market participation 
increases in the rainfall shocks (ex post) as 
well as in rainfall riskiness (ex ante). 
Cameron and 
Worswick (2003) 
Indonesia 1993 
Rainfall 
variability 
Consumption 
variability 
Male family members tend to reallocate their 
labor time potential towards more productive 
activities than farming after a shock event. 
Kenjiro (2005) Cambodia 2002 Crop loss 
Consumption 
variability 
In reaction to a crop loss shock, earning 
additional income by increasing or 
reallocating labor time was observed ex post 
Menon (2009) Nepal 1995-1996 
Rainfall 
variability 
Occupational 
diversification 
Household specialization is sensitive towards 
rainfall variability and the degree of 
specialization is lower where rainfall 
variability is higher 
Skoufias et al. (2017) India 2002-2003 
Rainfall 
variability 
Occupational 
diversification 
Rainfall variability and realized volatility lead 
to a diversification in income structures. 
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Study Study area 
Observation 
period 
Type of shock(s) 
under 
consideration 
Dependent variable Main results 
Corall and 
Radchenko (2017) 
Nigeria 2010-2011 
Rainfall 
variability 
Occupational 
diversification 
Spatial dependence  in occupation choice 
patterns and rainfall variability are the major 
drivers of income source diversification 
Child labor and school enrolment 
Janvry et al. (2006) Mexico 1997-2000 Droughts, NatCat School enrolment 
The occurrence of natural catastrophes 
decreases school enrolment by 3.2 
percentage points while school enrolment 
stays unaffected from drought events 
Beegle et al. (2006) Tanzania 1991-1994 Crop loss 
Extent of child 
labor 
Following a crop loss, child labor is 
distributed towards domestic work while the 
time allocated to farming increases in an 
unsystematic way 
Gubert and 
Robilliard (2007) 
Madagascar 1995-2002 
Rainfall 
variability 
School enrolment 
While school entrance probabilities are 
unsystematically affected by rainfall 
variability, dropout rates are higher when 
income shocks are negative and positive if the 
income increases. 
Alvi and Dendir 
(2011) 
African and 
Asian LDCs 
1998-1999 
Rainfall 
variability 
School enrolment 
No evidence of drought events impacting on 
school enrolment. 
Zamand and Hyder 
(2016) 
Ethiopia, 
India, Peru, 
Vietnam 
2009 
Rainfall 
variability 
School enrolment 
and performance 
No systematic impact of rainfall variability on 
school enrolment but school performance 
measures 
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Study Study area 
Observation 
period 
Type of shock(s) 
under 
consideration 
Dependent variable Main results 
Child labor and school enrolment (ctd.) 
Shah and Steinberg 
(2017) India 2005-2009 
Rainfall 
variability 
School enrolment 
and performance 
School enrolment rate reacts with a time lag 
on drought events while performance 
measures are immediately negatively affected 
Frempong and 
Stadelmann (2017) 
Uganda 2009-2010 Food price shock School enrolment 
Negative effect on the school enrolment rate 
and positive effects on the decision to work 
after experiencing a shock event 
Remarks: Observation periods relate to the observation period for the household level data. The price data may stem from later periods. 
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Child labor time, for instance, is used to replace the domestic workforce of women 
who then work on the farm or supply labor to labor markets. While school 
enrolment was largely unaffected by shock events, school dropout rates as well as 
measures of human capital formation effort deteriorated.  
With respect to labor time reallocation, the evidence was mixed with studies 
identifying worsened labor market conditions in the aftermath of a drought event 
and others identifying an increase in labor supply in reaction to shock events. Most 
likely, labor reallocation decisions will depend on the characteristics of labor 
markets: A rainfall shock will lead to worsening agricultural labor market conditions 
while non-agricultural labor markets may remain unaffected. 
The review has also shown that wage adaptations to food price and productivity 
shocks do not provide perfect implicit insurance as asymmetric bargaining powers 
as well as long adaptation periods provide an unreliable protection. 
The review has shown that households in developing and emerging countries are 
highly threatened by rainfall and food price risks. The review of quantifying studies 
has revealed significant income risks induced by rainfall failures and food price 
shocks. The analysis of coping strategies has shown that the realization of risks leads 
to suboptimal allocations of labor time, has spillover effects with respect to human 
capital formation or may also induce other long-lasting consequences such as 
impaired child nutrition and health.  
These insights open the discussion towards better risk management in developing 
countries. It reveals new perspectives on vulnerable population groups- rural poor 
with respect to rainfall failure and urban poor with respect to food price increases.  
It also encourages labor market reforms to improve the bargaining position of 
laborers. Furthermore, it also links the discussion with issues of financial inclusion, 
to give poor households access to formal risk management instruments to better 
manage their production and consumption risks using microinsurance, savings 
accounts and credit. 
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3 Labor time allocation of farm households: The case of 
food price and rainfall variability 3F4 
Abstract 
Subsistence farmers in low income countries are confronted with multiple 
risks. In reaction to them, farm households have developed several strategies 
to cope with yield risks to self-insure against these income shocks. Recent 
developments in global food markets have increased food price volatility, 
which, in particular, puts low-income households at risk. When small-scale 
farmers allocate their labor time over different income generating activities, 
they face the risk of uncertain purchasing power of income in the presence of 
food price variability. The paper analyzes the labor time allocation decision 
between self-employment and wage labor, taking into account the uncertain 
purchasing power of wages resulting from food price volatility. Using a panel 
structured household data set containing consumer-producer households in 
rural India, the labor time allocation decision between farming and labor 
market participation will be analyzed. The analysis reveals counterintuitive 
time allocation effects of risk. 
4 I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Deutscher Verein für 
Versicherungswissenschaft (DVfVW e.V.). In addition, this work would not have been 
possible without the countless remarks and propositions from the participants of the 56th 
annual conference of the Indian Society of Labor Economics, the 3rd World Risk and 
Insurance Economics Congress, the annual conference of the  DVfVW and several doctoral 
seminars at the Institute of Health Care & Public Management, University of Hohenheim. I 
particularly thank ICRISAT for providing the analyzed data.   
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3.1 Introduction 
Life in LDCs is marked by a risky environment: Weather-induced hazards, such as 
uncertain rainfall or floods, diseases or other family tragedies such as illness or 
death of the breadwinner, as well as risks on the macroeconomic level, such as 
political unrest, riots and friction in international commodity markets put income 
streams at risk. As formal insurance and credit markets are incomplete in 
developing countries, informal risk management strategies have gained particular 
importance in mitigating income risks of farm households (Townsend, 1994). 
Within the set of informal risk management strategies applied by low-income farm 
households, labor markets are of vital importance to flattening the income 
fluctuations. Farm households split up their labor time potential and allocate it over 
different income generating activities, such as self-employed farming but also 
contractual labor in farming or non-farming activities. Thereby, farm households 
diversify their income portfolio and earn profits from selling the agricultural yield 
but earn wage income as well. Thus, they reduce the degree of dependency from 
events that determine agricultural productivity (Fernández et al., 2014, Cameron 
and Worswick, 2003, Rose, 2001, Kochar, 1999, Kanwar, 1999).  
However, in the face of volatile and unpredictable consumption goods price changes, 
the diversification effect of labor time allocation may be overestimated. If 
consumption goods prices rise unexpectedly, this devalues wages in terms of their 
purchasing power. Hence, volatile food prices might put households in a situation 
where they are unable to purchase the amount of food necessary to substitute the 
amount of energy expended on the income-generating remunerated activity 
(Dalgaard and Strulik, 2011). Thus, by shifting time to the labor market, households 
diversify their production risk but have to accept the purchasing power risk of their 
wages induced by volatile food prices such that the magnitude of income 
diversification may be lower than expected.  
Several studies consider the issue of farm household’s labor time allocation and 
income diversification. First generation models find that they allocate labor time 
such that, in equilibrium, marginal value products of different income generating 
activities are equalized (Sumner, 1982, Rosenzweig, 1980). However, these first 
generation models leave risk considerations aside.  
Other studies incorporate risk into the labor time allocation decision (Skoufias et al., 
2017, Bandyopadhyay and Skoufias, 2015, Démurger et al., 2010, Menon, 2009, 
Taylor and Adelman, 2003, Abdulai and Crole Rees, 2001, Rose, 2001, Kanwar, 1999, 
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Mishra and Goodwin, 1998, Mishra and Goodwin, 1997). These authors find that 
labor time allocation is used as a risk-coping (ex post) and risk management (ex 
ante) strategy to smooth income streams. Most of the studies model a rainfall or 
price induced yield risk as a farm activity risk while others integrate dual income 
risks by analyzing the labor time allocation under joint farm income and labor 
market income uncertainty, for instance due to unemployment risks.  
None of these studies, however, takes into account the issue of consumption risk 
induced by food price volatility as a source of labor market income uncertainty and 
its effect on labor time allocation. This gap will be closed by this study. In particular, 
the study presented in this paper tries to answer the following questions: What is 
the effect of yield risks on on- and off-farm labor supply? What is the effect of food 
price variability induced consumption risk on on- and off-farm labor supply?  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents a literature 
review and develops the framework which is used for analyzing consumption risks. 
Section 3.3 describes the analyzed data and the development of the empirical model. 
Section 3.4 explains the results while section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Theoretical background 
3.2.1 Consumption risk  
Farm households, confronted with a multitude of income risks, have developed ex 
ante as well as ex post strategies to cope with income uncertainty. Among others, 
labor time allocation is one of the strategies employed by the households under 
study. Thus, farm households split their labor time potential into several parts to use 
it for different income generating activities, mostly farming and supplying labor to 
the labor market.  
Receiving wage income, however, means taking a consumption risk if consumption 
goods prices are volatile and wages are not indexed or do not adapt immediately. In 
this sense, unexpected price changes represent a depreciation or appreciation of 
wages such that the amount of consumption goods available need not be equal to the 
amount the household had expected to purchase when entering into the labor 
relationship. As the majority of expenditures are being made on food consumption, 
low-income households engaged in labor market relations are particularly 
vulnerable to changes in prices of staple food which they consume but do not 
produce themselves.  
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On a global scale, food price volatility was an issue even before the crisis in 2007-08. 
The discussion of the reasons for an increase in global commodity prices is still 
ongoing, yet their consequences are felt by low-income households in particular. 
Figure 3-1 below shows the evolution of the average nominal food price index since 
1996 deflated by the consumer price index for three groups of countries with 2005 
as the base year: those with a GDP per capita below 2.000 $ p.a. (blue), those with a 
GDP per capita between 2.000 and 10.000 $ p.a. (red) and those with a GDP per 
capita above 10.000 $ (green). 
Figure 3-1: Evolution of global food prices4F5
Figure 3-1 depicts two things. First, it can be seen that the average food price index 
increased substantially during the food price crisis of 2007-08 in all three country 
groups, while the increase was stronger the poorer a country was. Thus, the poorest 
countries are the ones most affected by increases of average food price levels. A 
second fact is that the volatility of food prices is the highest in the poorest group of 
countries. However, while the food price crisis of 2007-08 changed the level of food 
prices substantially, the level of food price volatility did not increase to the same 
extent. The situation for the poorest group of countries is tightened by the fact that 
food expenditures represent the most important household expenditures in least 
5 Source: Kalkuhl et al. (2013) 
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developed countries (Banerjee and Duflo, 2012). Food price variability and 
increasing food prices became a global issue and several governments got under 
pressure when distressed populations revolted against rising food prices.  
Figure 3-2 below illustrates the consumption risk discussion from the perspective of 
a consumer-producer household. The graph defines the action space of a cash crop 
producer, i.e. a farmer who does not seek food self-sufficiency from his own 
production but rather to produce crops to sell them at goods markets. This 
corresponds with the predominant production structure of farm households used in 
this study.  
 
Figure 3-2: Action spaces of consumer-producer households 
Figure 3-2 illustrates the action space within an informal risk management 
framework. A farmer on the left hand side of the graph is concentrating its labor 
resources in farming while the one on the right hand side splits up its labor time 
potential between farming and supplying time to the labor market.  
If a farmer decides to specialize in farming and to plant cash crops, he faces a rainfall 
induced yield risk as does the producer who splits up his labor time potential. Using 
Action spaces of consumer-producer households 
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the income from selling the crops to agricultural markets, the specialized farmer 
faces a consumption risk as the income from selling his output may be devaluated by 
rising food prices. As the analysis aims for variable food prices, potential variability 
in output prices for the cash crops are unconsidered in this framework. 
The same is true for the farmer who splits up his labor time potential. Receiving a 
wage income –cash or kind– he faces uncertainty over the amount of food he is able 
to purchase with his non-indexed wage income. Hence, the sources of income risks 
between specialized and non-specialized farmers are relatively equal. However, the 
specialized farmer faces a sequential income risk while the time allocating farmer 
faces a simultaneous income risk.  
To conclude, the fact that low-income households allocate labor time towards wage-
based activities creates consumption risks in the presence of food price volatility. If 
one considers consumer-producer cash crop producers, it turned out that the 
sources of income risks do not differ. However, labor time allocation changes the 
time structure of income risks. At the same time, labor time allocation leads to a loss 
in specialization but diversifies the income risk. However, the diversification effect 
may be overstated due to consumption risk such that the overall income risk 
decreases less than it had been expected by the diversifying farmer. Whether these 
consumption risks are affecting the decision to allocate labor time will be part of the 
empirical analysis in subsequent parts.  
3.2.2 Literature review 
In the previous section a rationale for labor time allocation decisions dependent on 
food price volatility was given. In what follows, labor time allocation patterns of the 
households under study will be analyzed more closely and a literature review on the 
effects of uncertainty in labor time allocation will be provided. 
The aspect of time allocation between self-employed land cultivation and labor 
market activity has received certain attention in the scientific literature: 
Fundamental work in the field of farm-time allocation in a riskless framework has 
been made by Sumner (1982) and Rosenzweig (1980). According to these authors, 
time allocation depends on the value of time spent on and off the farm, determined 
by profits from selling the output and constant unit of time wages. As the activity 
rewards –profits and wages– are known with certainty, every individual is able to 
determine and implement its optimal time allocation according to the observable 
and personal fundamentals.  
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Subsequently, several authors conducted research on the allocation of labor time if 
farm-income or off-farm income is uncertain for reasons of farm-product price 
variability (Mishra and Goodwin, 1997), uncertain rainfall (Skoufias et al., 2017, 
Bandyopadhyay and Skoufias, 2015) or uncertain labor market conditions and 
unemployment risks (Kanwar, 1999, Mishra and Goodwin, 1998). Both sources of 
income risk, producer price variability and unemployment, have a significant impact 
on labor supply: Higher producer price variability increases the amount of time 
allocated to labor market activity, whereas a higher unemployment rate decreases 
the amount of time allocated to the labor market. The latter authors conducted their 
studies on the behavior of US-farmers, thus providing findings for well developed 
markets and industrialized countries. 
Mishra and Holthausen (2002) introduced on-farm and off-farm income variability 
on an aggregate level into the analysis. By analyzing a sample of US-farm households 
from Kansas and North Carolina, they introduced farm income as well as wage 
variability as explanatory variables. Their main result is that an increase in farm 
variability stimulates off-farm employment whereas an increase in wage variability 
decreases the allocation towards off-farm employment. 
Rose (2001) extended the analysis of farm household decision making on farm 
households in developing countries, in this case Indian farmers and their labor 
market participation in the face of lacking rainfall and induced drought risks. The 
author finds an increase in the ex ante likelihood of labor market participation for 
drought risks such that households anticipate drought risks. At the same time, she 
finds an ex post reaction with an increase in labor market participation probability 
as a risk-coping strategy. However, she only considered a single source of income 
uncertainty, namely, weather-related yield risks. In her formulation, offering labor is 
a risk management strategy to respond to weather fluctuations while labor 
productivity is not subject to risk.  
Ruben and van den Berg (2001) find evidence that agricultural households split 
their time endowment between work in the cooperative and work in their own field. 
However, the case of time allocation between self-employment and work in a 
cooperative is not comparable to the case where individuals divide their labor time 
between self- and wage employment as long as the members of the cooperative 
produce food crops. Food price volatility puts those at risk who are net buyers of 
food and, in addition, are dependent on the purchasing power of labor market 
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income. Members of cooperatives face some sort of natural hedge against risks that 
have to be borne by smallholder farm households being active in the labor market.  
Other scholars are drawing on intra-household allocation of labor resources and 
estimate the probability that a household head and its dependents have the same 
occupation. Skoufias et al. (2017) and Menon (2009) find a negative effect of the 
riskiness of rainfall distributions on the likelihood that all household member have 
the same occupation. In other words, rainfall risks increase the probability that 
income generating activities across household members are diversified. 
Kochar (1999) finds that agricultural labor markets are used as a coping instrument 
to absorb income shocks. However, the author’s analysis is restricted to 
idiosyncratic shocks, whereas food price shocks have a systemic character.  
A point that has been neglected in the allocation of labor time is the issue of volatile 
and uncertain food prices in developing countries as an important source of labor 
market-related income risk. Previous studies, such as Mishra and Goodwin (1998), 
hypothesize that labor market related income is threatened by unemployment. 
However, due to growing urbanization and migration of the younger generation, 
unemployment is not the major issue in Indian agricultural labor markets but rather 
a lack of labor (Ramana Reddy et al., 2011). To the best of my knowledge, the joint 
uncertainty structure of rainfall and food price risks and its effect on labor time 
allocation in developing countries has not been considered in the literature so far. 
Hence, this study will complement research at this point. 
3.3 Data description & Empirical strategy 
3.3.1 Data 
The previous section outlined the rationale that food price volatility might be a 
determinant of labor time allocation. In what follows, the description of the analyzed 
data as well as the empirical specification will be presented.  
The data analyzed in this study is taken from a panel data set collected by the 
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), which 
continuously surveys households in several states of India with respect to –among 
others– cropping patterns, input purchases, sold outputs and consumption 
expenditures. Due to low levels of mechanization and technology use, agricultural 
activity in these states is highly dependent on the intensity and correct timing of the 
monsoon. Hence, agricultural income is periled whenever rainfall fails.  
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In this study, the waves of 2009 through 2012 are used, which comprise 8,570 
observation points. The study analyzes labor time allocation on the individual level. 
Eighteen villages in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Gujarat, Maharashtra 
and Madhya Pradesh have been chosen, as they are located in remote areas such 
that the households under consideration have only limited opportunities to 
consume from different markets in the case of adverse price shocks. Producers in 
the data set are primarily cash crop producers, i.e. they cultivate crops which are not 
produced for their own consumption but rather to be sold on agricultural markets. A 
small quantity of farmers produces insignificant quantities of rice and wheat, the 
two types of staple food which will be considered as consumption goods in the 
subsequent analysis. Thus, the representative consumer-producer household is a 
net purchaser of food even if he may produce quantities of goods intended for its 
own consumption. 
Labor markets in these states are marked by a high degree of informality and 
spontaneity. In most cases, employers hire workers the day before they are 
supposed to start working or even in the morning of the working day. These tasks 
are mostly performed by day laborers who are remunerated on a piece basis, i.e. 
wages per units of output. While caste affiliation has only a minor influence on 
hiring decisions, most tasks on daily wage basis are highly gender specific (Walker 
and Ryan, 1990). Reported involuntary unemployment of households under study is 
rather low: On average, individuals were unable to find employment on 9.3 days of 
the calendar year for the population in the employable age between 15 and 65.   
Households are primarily net food consumers; the major production good is 
sugarcane. Table 3-1 shows the sample’s summary statistics, separated for different 
subgroups. Column A reflects the full sample properties of all 8,570 observation 
points. Column B and C further distinguish households that did not participate in 
labor markets (Column B) or supplied positive amounts of time towards labor 
market activities (Column C) but excludes inactive or individuals solely occupied 
with unpaid housework. Column D depicts the results of a two-sided t-test for mean 
differences between the subgroups in column B and C. All variables described below 
were measured on a yearly basis such that there is no difference between the 
cropping and planting season. The time allocation decision is considered to be 
constant throughout the whole agricultural year. 
It can be seen that the educational level is on average rather low and amounts to 5.8 
years of schooling in the whole sample. Non-labor supplying households show a 
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slightly higher educational level compared to labor market participants, the mean 
difference is significant on any significance level.  
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
Full sample 
Non labor market 
participating 
households 
Labor market 
participating 
households 
t-test for
mean 
differences 
age 35.99 34.46 37.26 *** 
[Age in years] (18.01) (21.45) (14.22) 
yrs_edu 5.82 6.05 5.66 *** 
[Years of schooling] (4.703) (4.484) (4.831) 
hh_size 5.73 6.00 5.34 *** 
[Household size] (2.680) (2.937) (2.358) 
farm_size 6.66 8.06 5.31 *** 
[Acre] (7.727) (8.349) (6.316) 
irriare 0.49 0.55 0.45 *** 
[% share of irrigeable farm size] (0.412) (0.398) (0.422) 
degab 0.80 0.65 0.93 *** 
[Share with highest physical ability] (0.402) (0.477) (0.255) 
male 0.52 0.44 0.61 *** 
[1 if male] (0.500) (0.496) (0.489) 
married 0.65 0.53 0.75 *** 
[1 if married] (0.477) (0.499) (0.432) 
revenue 500,000 610,000 340,000 *** 
[Revenue from farming, INR] (1,342,209.4) (1,561,596.3) (1,054,769.0) 
cap_inp 26,050.47 30,465.05 20,248.96 *** 
[Value of physical capital input, INR] (45,267.5) (49,104.5) (34,458.6) 
inc 470,000 560,000 330,000 *** 
[Household income, INR] (1,308,538.5) (1,527,897.4) (1,029,637.3) 
farm_days 87.22 83.34 79.43 * 
[Farm days per year] (91.32) (103.0) (78.06) 
rain_loss 0.23 0.19 0.26 *** 
[Share of households incurring a rain 
induced loss] 
(0.419) (0.394) (0.436) 
Observations 8570 3748 4034 
 Standard deviations in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 3-1: Summary statistics 
Non-labor market participating households display on average larger household 
sized with on average 6 members compared to 5.3 members across the participating 
61 
 
households. Again, the mean difference is significant on any significance level. 
According to the summary statistics, labor time allocation seems to be significantly 
negatively affected by the farm size:  The average farm size across the households 
not active in labor markets is significantly larger than the farm size of households 
who are active in the labor market, with on average 8.06 acres compared to 5.31 
acres of farm size5F6. 
Smaller farm sizes are hypothesized to entail a higher production risk as a smaller 
farm surface provides fewer opportunities for crop diversification. Thus, farm size 
could be seen as an exogenous parameter of informal risk management. It also 
seems that labor time allocation is an instrument of the less professional farmers. To 
the extent that irrigation requires capital inputs and technology, households that are 
not active in labor markets dispose on average of more irrigable area than 
households that are active in labor markets, comparing a share of 55 to 45 per cent 
of irrigable farm surface for the respective subgroups. A similar picture turns out 
when it comes to physical capital employed in the agricultural production process: It 
is lower among the labor market participating households compared to the non-
participating ones with on average INR 20,248 compared to INR 30,465 of capital 
stock value.  
This part of the descriptive analysis is complemented by the revenue from farming, 
which amounts to INR 610,000 on average for the non-participating households and 
INR 340,000 for the labor market participating households respectively. In 
combination with smaller farm size, lower capital input and lower irrigable area 
shares, those who allocate labor time seem to be the type of households that are to a 
higher degree small-scale and subsistence farmers. This farmer type is more 
vulnerable towards rainfall variability as their smaller farms provide less potential 
for crop diversification and who have less opportunities to employ fertilizer, 
machinery or irrigation in the production process.   
In addition, there is descriptive evidence that labor time allocation is also used as an 
ex post reaction towards rainfall variability. This is shown by the fact that the share 
of households that incurred a deficient rain related income loss is higher among the 
labor market participating households compared to the non-participating ones. 
                                                             
6
 Compared to European farms, the average farm of this sample is a small holder farm. 6.66 
acres correspond to almost 2.7 hectares. The median farm size in Germany in the year 2011 
was between 100 and 150 hectares (Deutscher Bauernverband, 2016)  
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In the following part, the empirical specification will be presented to test the impact 
of risk –production and purchasing power uncertainty– on labor time allocation 
decisions.    
3.3.2 Empirical specification 
As it will be pointed out in the part on the empirical specification, the panel 
structure of the dataset cannot be used by employing models to correct for 
unobserved heterogeneity. Hence, a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model will 
be estimated and further specified in subsequent parts of this chapter. 
As stated above, the effect of joint income uncertainty on labor allocation decisions 
will be tested using a pooled OLS model.  The empirical model is given by expression 
(1): 
𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚_𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2 × 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3 × 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + Γ′𝑋 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   (1) 
where 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚_𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑡  is equal to the number of farm days except housework (farming 
and livestock rearing) in year t per individual. To account for the effects of farm 
income uncertainty and uncertainty about the purchasing power of income, the 
standard deviations of rainfall amounts and representative food prices have been 
included into the estimation. Due to the limited availability of food price data at the 
village level, it is not possible to integrate updating standard deviations of food 
prices into the regression model. This excludes standard panel data models as a 
constant standard deviation for a particular consumption good would vanish from 
every fixed effect regression model. To estimate the effect of price risk on labor time 
allocation, pooled models had to be applied. Using the standard deviation in the 
context of agricultural production risk might be problematic as this implicitly 
assumes that positive and negative deviations from the mean were equally harmful. 
This implicit assumption can be accepted with respect to rainfall variability as 
positive and negative deviations are equally harmful for agricultural activity. 
However, for robustness checks, other measures of rainfall variability such as the 
yearly deviations from the mean have been used as regressors. The results of this 
estimation similar time allocation effects and are available upon request. 
𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 describes the standard deviation of rainfall levels in a specific village i. It is 
computed using a time series of rainfall data for the villages under study, spanning 
at least a period of seven years for every village. Thus, the production risk is 
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measured on the village level and constitutes a constant value throughout the waves 
for every individual living in the same village. It is hypothesized that higher levels of 
standard deviations reflect higher farm production risks.   
To separate the effects of farm profit and purchasing power uncertainty, a measure 
for uncertain consumer prices is used by considering representative food prices of 
basic commodities such as rice and wheat. Village prices were used according to the 
ICRISAT-terminology as non-subsidized shop prices at the local village trader.  
𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 describes the standard deviation of wheat prices at a specific village i, 
where four years of unsubsidized wheat prices at the village level have been 
aggregated to compute the standard deviation. The same has been made for another 
broadly available and typical consumption good, namely rice. This has been included 
by s𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖. Again, it is assumed that higher levels of standard deviation reflect 
higher consumption risks faced by the consumers.  
Multicollinearity induced by a high correlation between regressors may influence 
the size of standard errors and hence the empirical inference (cf. Bekaert et al., 
2009). As standard deviations of rainfall levels and food prices may be highly 
correlated with each other as well as standard deviations of food prices among each 
other, the standard deviations of food prices have been orthogonalized with respect 
to rainfall deviations and remaining food prices. Hence, an auxiliary regression 
according to (2) and (3) was performed for the staple foods rice and wheat: 
 
𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖                                                  (2) 
 
𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖                                                  (3) 
 
The residuals of the auxiliary regression (2) and (3) have been used as regressors in 
(1). Next to the major explanatory variables, the matrix X contains several control 
variables, such as household size, age, education, physical ability, etc which will be 
introduced and justified in what follows.  
Several studies point out the importance of age – included as [𝑎𝑔𝑒] – and education 
– included as [𝑦𝑟𝑠_𝑒𝑑𝑢] – for labor market participation decisions of farm 
households as a measure of experience and the degree of formal training (cf. Mathse 
and Young, 2004, Mishra and Holthausen, 2002, Ruben and van den Berg, 2001, 
Abdulai and Delgado, 1999). These studies point out that the degree of labor market 
participation increases up to a specific age and decreases thereafter. Hence, the 
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quadratic term of age [𝑎𝑔𝑒2] will also be included in the analysis. In all subsequent 
specifications, the sample of individuals was restricted to individuals of at least nine 
years. Screening the data turned out that respondent’s physical ability changed to 
the highest employable level at the age of around nine. Robustness checks have been 
performed, altering the age boarder. As the results changed only gradually, they will 
not be reported in the paper. 
Another critical factor that has been identified to affect labor time allocation is 
gender (Abdulai and Delgado, 1999, Mishra and Goodwin, 1997). Gender specific 
off-farm labor supply decisions are interrelated between household members. This 
is why a joint off-farm labor supply equation will be estimated, integrating potential 
gender differences by a dummy variable.   
Abdulai and Crole Rees (2001) describe that households in remote areas show less 
diversified income portfolios than households living closer to urban centers. Hence, 
it is hypothesized that large agglomerations provide a more diversified labor market 
and thus more potential employment alternatives besides farming. Thus, a measure 
of market distance has been included in the set of control variables to proxy job 
opportunities besides agriculture [𝑚𝑟𝑘𝑡_𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡]. 
Other variables that have been included into the analysis are physical ability 
[𝑑𝑒𝑔_𝑎𝑏], marital status [𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑] as well as farm size [𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒] and household 
size  [ℎℎ_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒]. As consumption price fluctuations could also be absorbed by an 
increase of own product consumption, it is also controlled for home consumption of 
produced goods. As production structures are highly heterogeneous, the regression 
will control for the value of consumption, hence the difference between gross value 
of own products and the income from farming. In addition, the amount of physical 
capital included in the production has been integrated as a further control variable. 
In order to conduct robustness checks and to extend the analysis, labor market 
participation behavior will also be analyzed. For this purpose, a probit model of 
labor market participation will be estimated in the first step. In a second step, the 
labor supply function for those individuals that are active in the labor market will be 
estimated. This robustness check is being done to verify that farm time allocation 
and time allocated to labor markets are reciprocal decisions. The model to estimate 
the likelihood of labor market participation is given by equation (4): 
𝑃𝑟(𝑌 = 1|𝑋 = 𝑥) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2 × 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3 × 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛤
′𝑋 + 𝜖𝑖 (4)
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The dependent variable takes on the value of 1 if the considered individual reports 
at least one day of labor market participation in any year. The empirical model (4) 
contains the same measures of risk, either on the farm or the labor market level, as 
well as the control variables specified in the empirical model 1 above. 
The model to estimate the extent to which an individual is active in the labor market 
is given by equation (5): 
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘_𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2 × 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3 × 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + Γ
′𝑋 + 𝜖𝑡𝑖(5)
where 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘_𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖 is equal to the number of work days of an individual employed in 
the labor market during a calendar year. The sample has been restricted to the 
group of individuals that exhibit positive labor market participation, and again, were 
at least nine years old. 
3.4 Results 
In the following section, the results of the pooled OLS estimation as well as of the 
probit model will be presented. As noted in the previous section, the dependent 
variables are the number of farming days as well as the number of workdays and the 
binary variable of labor market participation. Table 3-2 below summarizes the 
results of the estimation procedures and shows the estimated coefficients for the 
variables of interest. A focus of the analysis is made on the determination of paid 
activities to account for purely monetary risks induced by weather shocks and food 
price variability.  
In regression (I), which comprises the whole sample of households, farm income 
variability increases the amount of time allocated towards the own farm 
significantly, everything else held equal. Hence, there is empirical evidence that farm 
labor input and rain are substitutes; a higher rainfall risk seems to be compensated 
by a higher labor input on the farm. The result also holds for the sub-group analyzed 
in regression (Ia) where households that – among other goods – cultivated rice or 
wheat, were excluded. Also in this subgroup, an increase in the rainfall risk increases 
the amount of time allocated towards the own farm.  
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(I) (Ia) (II) (IIa) (III) 
farm_days farm_days lmpart lmpart work_days 
Pooled-OLS Pooled-OLS Probit AME Pooled-OLS 
age 3.842*** 4.447*** 0.155*** 0.0425*** 8.919*** 
(6.59) (7.04) (21.57) (20.76) (5.80) 
age2 -0.0414*** -0.0473*** -0.00185*** -0.000507*** -0.102***
(-6.02) (-6.07) (-24.13) (-23.48) (-6.36) 
yrs_edu -2.946*** -2.657*** -0.0126 -0.00344 4.775*** 
(-5.20) (-5.23) (-1.19) (-1.20) (4.46) 
farm_size 1.044* 1.299** -0.0521*** -0.0143*** -2.270***
(2.05) (2.24) (-5.51) (-5.51) (-3.05) 
irriare 22.23*** 18.26*** -0.396*** -0.108*** -11.36* 
(4.71) (4.06) (-4.89) (-4.92) (-1.91) 
stdrain 13.49*** 14.69*** -0.0496 -0.0163 -16.44***
(18.13) (21.44) (-0.83) (-0.84) (-12.34) 
stdrice 0.0511*** 0.0750*** -0.00113*** -0.000308*** 0.0361** 
(3.60) (6.29) (-2.87) (-2.96) (2.38) 
stdwheat 0.204*** 0.193*** -0.000153 -0.0000419 -0.100** 
(7.17) (7.48) (-0.12) (-0.12) (-2.50) 
degab 37.82*** 36.53*** 0.641*** 0.175*** 11.70 
(6.17) (6.06) (5.81) (6.50) (0.79) 
male 41.59*** 42.13*** 0.608*** 0.167*** 25.13*** 
(3.86) (3.65) (4.64) (5.01) (4.36) 
married 16.37*** 16.19*** -0.168 -0.0461 -22.29***
(4.64) (4.70) (-1.29) (-1.28) (-2.97) 
mrkt_dist 2.203*** 0.105 -0.0803*** -0.022*** -0.370 
(4.31) (0.21) (-2.67) (-2.75) (-0.33) 
Observations 8570 7829 8054 8054 3816 
R2 0.334 0.341 0.193 
t-statistics in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is the number of farm days in 
the first two columns, a binary variable indicating positive labor market participation in column 3 and the number 
of labor market days for those who reported an active labor market participation in the last column. All 
regressions, except regression (IIa),  contain village  and year dummies. 
Table 3-2: Regression results  
As this first result seems to be in conflict with the standard perception of labor 
markets in risky surroundings, there is another plausible explanation for that 
observation: Rainfall shocks may translate into deteriorating labor market 
conditions. Taking the evidence by Walker and Ryan (1990) and the positive 
coefficient of farm production uncertainty, it is reasonable to conclude that labor 
market activity in rural areas may also be weather dependent. Hence, labor market 
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opportunities deteriorate in drought years such that farm households have no other 
option but to increase farm time (cf. Rose, 2001, Kanwar, 1999, Walker and Ryan, 
1990). In line with these findings, regression (III) finds that the amount of labor 
time allocated towards the labor market decreases in the rainfall risk, everything 
else held equal. Surprisingly, rainfall risks do not affect the decision to participate in 
labor market activities in a systematic way. This can be seen from regressions (II) 
and (IIa), which represent the probit model of labor market participation and the 
related average marginal effects (AME) respectively. 
Food price volatility affects time allocation decisions in a way that is consistent with 
theoretical predictions: An increase in the standard deviation of rice [𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒] and 
wheat [𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡] prices leads to an increase in the time allocated towards farming 
such that time resources are allocated away from the risky activity. One might 
oppose that rice or wheat producers would benefit from increasing prices. Hence, 
regression (Ia) excludes households that cultivated – among other goods –rice or 
wheat in any of the analyzed periods. It can be seen that the initial effect of food 
price volatility and its allocation effect for labor time persists in regression (Ia). 
Thus, an increase in the level of food price volatility increases the time allocated 
towards farming across the consumers of rice and wheat, everything else held equal. 
However, regression (Ia) reveals a more pronounced effect for the reallocation 
effect of rice price uncertainty compared to regression (I) which included the rice 
farmers. It is also remarkable that the reallocation effect induced by wheat is four 
times as large as the reallocation effect induced by rice price volatility.  
Almost in line with these findings are the coefficients on rice and wheat price risks 
of regression (III). While an increase in the wheat price risk decreases the extent to 
which households become active in labor markets, an increase in rice price risks has 
a rather opposing effect. This result does not change between excluding households 
that partially produced wheat or rice and including them into the regression.  
Other determinants of labor time allocation are revealed or confirm previous 
evidence. An individual’s age [𝑎𝑔𝑒] affects any allocation decision in a positive and 
significant way, everything else held equal. As the squared term [𝑎𝑔𝑒2] is negative 
and significant in any of the regressions, there exists a maximum age after which the 
farm time allocation decreases. Using the results of regression (I) the peak is 
reached at an age of almost 46 years. 
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Education [𝑦𝑟𝑠_𝑒𝑑𝑢] has a decreasing effect on the farm time allocation, everything 
else held equal. Even though there is no systematic effect of education on the 
probability of participating in the labor market, education increases the extent to 
which individuals supply labor to the labor market significantly, everything else held 
equal. An intuition for that result could be that more educated individuals opt out 
from agriculture and chose white-collar employment.   
The farm size coefficient [𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒] is positive and significant in the farm time 
allocation regression (I). Hence, a larger farm size leads to an increase of the time 
allocated towards farming. Consequently, a larger farm size decreases the likelihood 
of being active in the labor market as well as it decreases the time allocated to labor 
market activities. 
Another informal risk management tool could be irrigation. In order to account for 
the possibility that irrigation is potentially an informal risk management instrument, 
the percentage share of irrigeable area has been included as a control variable as 
[𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑒]. It turns out that this variable has a large effect on the labor time allocation 
by increasing the time allocated towards farming whenever the percentage share of 
the irrigeable area increases, everything else held equal.  
Dropping the variable from the regression does not change the size or significance 
levels of the remaining coefficients. An analysis of variance increasing factors does 
not reveal issues of multicollinearity. Thus, irrigation can be seen as one of the major 
drivers behind labor time allocation decisions. Doubts about this effect persist as the 
share of the irrigeable area could also be a sign of the degree of professionality in 
farming, hence catching up all effects that are related to the importance of farm and 
wage income. As leaving out the variable from the regression does not change the 
results substantially and there are no concerns with respect to multicollinearity and 
the set of control variables is broad, the coefficient on [𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑒] will be reported 
nevertheless. 
The degree of physical ability [𝑑𝑒𝑔 _𝑎𝑏] as well as being male [𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒] has strong and 
positive effects on all types of income generating activities. Compared to physically 
less able individuals, those who are physically strong allocate significantly more 
time resources towards farming and supplying labor to labor markets. The same is 
true for the dummy variable gender, which confirms gender differences in the intra-
household work allocation.    
Being married [𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑] increases the amount of time allocated towards farming 
whereas it decreases the extent of time allocated to labor markets.  
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Another interesting result relates to the market distance [𝑚𝑟𝑘𝑡_𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡]. As has been 
pointed out in the specification part, previous literature found that households 
living in more remote areas exhibit less diversified income portfolios and are less 
likely to participate in labor market activities. This result is supported by the 
analysis presented in this study. An increasing market distance leads to higher time 
allocations towards farming and decreases the likelihood of labor market 
participation significantly, everything else held equal. The effect of the market 
distance on the extent of labor supply, however, is not clear-cut; the direction of the 
effect is negative, however, the coefficient is insignificant.  
To summarize, depending on the risk measure of farm income variability, food 
prices are crucial for the determination of farm time allocation towards agriculture. 
Depending on the underlying commodity and price constellation, labor time 
allocation changes with the riskiness of food price changes. The analysis has also 
shown that households are sensitive concerning real wage changes and adapt their 
labor time allocation in dependence of price changes. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
The study presented in this chapter has shown that food price volatility has a 
significant influence on the time allocation of agricultural households. Previous 
studies took output price uncertainty and unemployment into account when 
conducting research on the effects of uncertain farm income on the labor time 
allocation decision by agricultural households. According to the present study, food 
price volatility is another factor that puts the income of consumer-producer 
households at risk by devaluing the purchasing power of wages. By estimating a 
pooled OLS regression model, the farm time allocation as well as the determinants of 
the labor market participation and the extent to which households allocate time 
resources towards labor markets have been determined. The results largely confirm 
the considerations with respect to labor market participation: Households reallocate 
resources away from the risky alternative and engage more in farming whenever 
food price volatility increases. Hence, the purchasing power risk of income is taken 
into consideration by the households under study when determining their labor 
time allocation. This result is also valid when the estimation excludes rice and wheat 
producers. The majority of households are primarily cash crop producers of 
sugarcane, whereas food crops such as rice and maize are – if produced at all – 
primarily produced for home consumption, for which the regression controlled.  
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Surprisingly, households do not reallocate time resources in the predicted way with 
respect to farm production uncertainty. The analysis revealed that the effect of an 
increase in the rainfall variability on farm time allocation is positive. Hence 
households reallocate more time resources towards farming whenever the 
agricultural rain fed production is becoming more risky. This has been explained by 
the interrelation between rainfall variability and labor market conditions; rainfall 
variability affects labor market opportunities in a negative way.       
This study reveals important policy implications. Increased food price volatility in 
combination with agricultural production risk and agricultural labor market 
structures may force households to specialize in farming. Such a concentration in 
income-generating activities, however, is problematic because farm income is 
subject to weather outcomes. Thus, food price volatility forces households to 
concentrate their income sources and thereby increases vulnerability with respect 
to weather outcomes. Formal insurance products to ensure the income of farming 
households neglect the consumption risk of wage incomes, which forces individuals 
to alter their labor time allocation. Existing insurance products, such as index-based 
crop failure insurance, only ensure losses from agricultural activities whereas the 
income from off-farm work is entirely unprotected but periled by food price 
volatility. Thus, one potential countermeasure could be to more carefully consider 
the term income of farm households and to recognize that income is composed out 
of several sources. Hence, by enlarging the index variable of traditional index-based 
microinsurance with measures accounting for food price volatility would allow to 
trace the true income risk of farm households more appropriately. At the same time, 
enlarging the notion of income could also contribute to a greater demand for index-
based insurance such that the vulnerability of farm households could be reduced. In 
addition, this would push the labor time allocation towards the optimal allocation, 
the one that would materialize without food price volatility. Thus, better eliciting the 
true income risks and enhancing the understanding of livelihoods and processes by 
which income is generated might be crucial for understanding the microinsurance 
demand of farming households.  
Furthermore, the study provides implications for public policy: Labor markets have 
been identified as being decisive for risk coping. Consumption and production risk 
forces households to specialize in farming. Hence, one could conclude that measures 
to improve labor market access and diversity of labor market opportunities could 
have positive effects for the risk-management abilities of low-income households. 
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4 Income heterogeneity and index insurance demand 6F7 7F8
Abstract 
Weather index insurance as a tool to insure the income of 
agriculturally active households has triggered extensive discussions 
in the literature. Despite the convincing theoretical argumentation, 
the demand for these products stays behind expectations. Several 
studies revealed effects impacting the demand for index insurance, 
such as liquidity constraints, basis risk, lack of understanding and 
trust in insurers and products alike. This paper takes a different 
perspective and hypothesizes that low demand is due to 
heterogeneous risk exposure towards weather variability among 
potential insured. The paper tests the impact of income 
heterogeneity as a measure of risk exposure on insurance demand 
and finds that risk exposure negatively affects insurance demand. In 
order to increase demand, it is concluded that product design 
should emphasize more the importance of income risk composition 
and exposure of potentially insured. 
7 I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Deutscher Verein für 
Versicherungswissenschaft (DVfVW e.V., Berlin). In addition, this work would not have been 
possible without the countless remarks and propositions from the participants of the 2nd 
Rural Finance and Microfinance Conference, the annual conference of the DVfVW, the 
Prefonference event of the 12th International Microinsurance Conference hosted by the 
Center for the Economic Analysis of Risk and Glenn Harrison as well as several doctoral 
seminars at the Institute for Health Care & Public Management, University of Hohenheim. I 
wish to thank Shawn Cole, Giné, X., Tobacman, J., Townsend, R., Topalova, P. and J. Vickery for 
providing me with the data employed in this study. 
8 The paper is printed with kind permission of Springer Verlag. It has been originally 
published as: Hochscherf, J. (2017): Income heterogeneity and index insurance demand, 
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft, 106 (3-4): 343-368. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Agriculturally active low income households in least developed countries are facing 
a multitude of income risks such as weather related shocks, floods, droughts or 
storms,  but also human or animal diseases or death of family members and even 
political risks and conflicts etc. Due to lacking social safety nets and governments 
which are unable to provide assistance in case of hardship, the materialization of 
most of these risks induces strong income fluctuations for large parts of the 
population.  
Against this background, microinsurance as a hopeful instrument in the sphere of 
microfinance has evolved. Microinsurance shows some parallels with conventional 
insurance products, such as regular premium payments or conditional indemnity 
payments, although the terms and conditions are usually adapted to the target 
group (Churchill and McCord, 2012). Microinsurance products have to be affordable 
for low income households. Hence, the premium size is adapted to the financial 
strength of low income households. This implies that insurance companies need to 
cover similar administrative costs with comparably lower premiums if compared to 
a conventional insurance contract. For these reasons, index-based microinsurance  
products have evolved in order to insure systemic income risks of low income 
households. 
Index-based microinsurance products are mainly characterized by the fact that the 
indemnity payment is triggered by an independent and non-influenceable variable 
that is closely correlated with the insured event. An example is the amount of 
rainfall in a specified time period in order to indicate a potential crop loss in the case 
of crop insurance. Whenever the index undercuts a given threshold, automatic 
indemnity payments are triggered and transferred to the insured without further 
state verification. In this sense, index-based microinsurance does not suffer from 
adverse selection as indemnity payments are usually lump-sum and insured dispose 
of no informational advantage with respect to their individual risk (Hazell and Hess, 
2010). In addition, moral hazard incentives are minimized and costly state 
verification by the insurer is not necessary (Leblois and Quirion, 2013, Hazell and 
Hess, 2010, Breustedt et al., 2008). Surprisingly, despite the enormous risks 
threatening the incomes of agricultural households, the demand for index-based 
microinsurance products is lower than expected (Awel and Azomahou, 2015, Karlan 
et al., 2014, Cole et al., 2013, Norton et al., 2011, Hill and Robles, 2011, Giné et al., 
2010, Giné and Yang, 2009). 
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Lacking demand and the identification of demand driving factors have been subject 
to widespread research. Eling et al. (2014) provide an extensive review of demand 
studies. Several studies revealed counterintuitive demand patterns such as 
decreasing demand probabilities in the degree of self-reported risk aversion 
(Dercon et al., 2011, Giesbert et al., 2011, Giné et al., 2008). This has widely been 
interpreted as a lack of trust, such that those with higher degrees of self-reported 
risk aversion trust less in insurers and products alike and thus show lower 
insurance adoption rates. 
A product inherent characteristic of index-based microinsurance products is basis 
risk. This risk describes the possibility that insured households receive an 
indemnification without experiencing a loss or vice versa, experiencing a loss but 
receiving no indemnification. Several studies point out that the extent of basis risk 
impacts on demand in a negative way (Clarke, 2016, Brick and Visser, 2015, 
Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2012, Giné et al., 2008).  
Recent insights from behavioral economics imply that low demand may also be due 
to compound risk aversion. Index insurance contracts can be interpreted as 
compound lotteries. In experiments, Elabed and Carter (2015) found that low-
income households are unable to derive the actuarial equivalent simple lottery of a 
compound lottery and therefore refuse to buy an index insurance contract. They 
interpreted that behavior as compound risk aversion. 
None of the demand related literature cited above analyzed the interrelationship 
between informal risk management in the form of labor time allocation and formal 
insurance demand. Controlling for other identified demand factors, this gap will be 
closed and the effect of labor time allocation and resulting heterogeneity in the 
income composition on insurance demand will be empirically analyzed in this paper. 
For this purpose, it is argued that low demand for index-based weather insurance 
may be observed due to varying degrees of risk exposure towards rainfall variability 
as a consequence of informal risk management: Risk averse households apply 
informal risk management in the form of labor time allocation (Bandyopadhyay and 
Skoufias, 2015, Rose, 2001, Kanwar, 1999, Mishra and Goodwin, 1998, Mishra and 
Goodwin, 1997). In consequence, some households rely more on farm income while 
others rely more on a combination of farm and non-agricultural labor market 
income. Thus, depending on the income composition, weather insurance written on 
rainfall variability has a varying return for different households as the correlation 
between index and income realizations might differ.  
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Hence, it is straightforward to expect that households earning higher income shares 
from non-agricultural labor have reduced incentives to buy index-insurance 
products written on rainfall variability due to a lower risk exposure towards rainfall 
fluctuations. This adds another interpretation of the relation between risk aversion 
and formal insurance demand: More risk averse households apply more informal 
risk management and have more diversified income structures. Due to the higher 
degree of informal income protection, formal insurance contracts exert a lower risk 
reducing effect on these households. Thus, the negative effect of risk aversion on 
insurance demand could also be explained by a higher activity level in informal risk 
management by the more risk averse individuals and a resulting higher degree of 
informal protection.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 4.2, a literature 
review on identified demand determinants will be given. Section 4.3 presents the 
data and the empirical specification. Section 4.4 presents the results of the 
estimations and section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Literature review  
The objective of this study is to analyze the relationship between informal risk-
management and formal insurance demand with a particular emphasis on risk 
exposure and labor time allocation. In this section, the literature on the main 
demand determinants for index-based microinsurance products will be presented. 
A product inherent characteristic of index-based microinsurance products is that 
indemnity payments are determined by observing an index that is closely correlated 
with the volatility of the underlying insured asset. In the case of drought insurance, 
the amount of rainfall within a specific area and time period is an indicator whether 
households living in the surrounding of a rainfall gauge incurred a rainfall induced 
income loss. The risk that index realizations and outcomes at the household level 
deviate from each other is the basis risk and its occurrence has been found to have a 
negative effect on insurance demand (Clarke, 2016, Brick and Visser, 2015, Mobarak 
and Rosenzweig, 2012, Skees, 2008,  Giné et al., 2008). Basis risk –which could also 
be understood as a contract non-performance risk– can prevent households from 
buying full-insurance, even if the premium is fair (cf. Clarke, 2016, Schlesinger and 
Schulenburg, 1987).   
The size of basis risk is mainly determined by the distance between the farm and the 
related rainfall gauge. As rainfall realizations are a regional event, larger distances 
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imply a larger prediction bias using the rainfall information from a specific rain 
gauge to predict loss experience at the farm level. Discussed countermeasures in the 
presence of basis risk comprise to subsidize the premium or to increase the density 
of rainfall gauges (Clarke, 2016). Another countermeasure is to use rainfall indices 
at different geographical levels to thereby increase the correlation between index 
and farm level outcome (Elabed et al., 2013).  
Heterogeneity in the income composition resulting from informal risk management 
can be seen as a particular form of basis risk as the correlation between index and 
income volatility decreases: Rainfall variability is a predictor of the productivity in 
farming but not in non-agricultural labor markets. Hence, households with a 
diversified income profile and relatively higher income shares from non-agricultural 
labor display a lower correlation between their income volatility and the underlying 
index compared to households that mostly rely on farming income. This 
corresponds to the definition of basis risk (cf. Clarke, 2016).   
Prior studies emphasized the importance of liquidity constraints and premium sizes 
to be decisive for microinsurance demand (Cole et al., 2013, Mobarak and 
Rosenzweig, 2012, Dercon et al., 2011). Other studies found that the take-up rate 
increases substantially if other modes of payment are chosen, such as contract 
farming or work programs in exchange for insurance coverage (Tadesse et al., 
2017). This argument is plausible as premium payments compete with other 
expenditures, such as seeds, fertilizer, machinery or the like taken out by the 
household.  Although it is evident that budget constraints are not the only reason to 
explain take-up decisions, they have been identified as being decisive for insurance 
purchase.  
Risk aversion has been found to have a negative effect on insurance demand 
(Dercon et al., 2011, Giesbert et al., 2011, Giné et al., 2008). Conventional wisdom 
assumes that more risk averse individuals would purchase more insurance coverage 
(Pratt, 1964). However, in the context of LDCs, Giesbert et al. (2011) explained the 
negative relationship by a lack of trust: Those individuals that are more risk averse 
are more suspicious about new and unknown products. In the case of insurance, a 
trust related factor might also be that an insurance contract is nothing but a promise 
to indemnify future losses under predefined conditions while the premium has to be 
paid on the spot. Thus, more risk averse individuals distrust the insurance provider 
with a higher likelihood and show therefore lower adoption rates.  
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A second story on the relation between risk aversion and insurance demand is 
added by this study: Risk aversion stimulates informal risk management activities 
and thereby decreases the incentive to buying formal insurance contracts.  
Another factor that has been identified as a crucial determinant for the participation 
in financial markets is financial literacy. Hilgert et al. (2003) showed that there is a 
positive impact of financial literacy on the quality of financial decisions, which have 
a short term character and actions that have a longer lasting planning horizon. 
Financial literacy has also been shown to have positive impacts on financial and 
stock market participation or on precautionary savings (Bassa Scheresberg, 2013, 
van Rooij et al., 2012, Christelis et al., 2010, Kimball and Shumway, 2006). In these 
studies, however, financial literacy is not generally and systematically linked with 
school education. 
Furthermore, it has been shown that financially more literate individuals do rely 
more likely on formal credit relationship and are better able to cope with 
macroeconomic shocks (Klapper et al., 2013). In addition, financially more literate 
households are less likely to enter into high-interest rate debt contracts and to 
accumulate more wealth in general (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). Summing up the 
evidence on financial literacy, forecasts on the household’s insurance demand is 
ambiguous: On the one hand, the likelihood of making sound decisions increases in 
the degree of financial literacy, which could be an argument to hypothesize that 
insurance demand increases with the degree of financial literacy. On the other hand, 
financially more literate households are also more likely to engage in precautionary 
savings which could serve as a substitute to formal insurance contracts. Applied to 
the microinsurance context, Cole et al. (2013) found positive effects of insurance 
training and education modules on insurance demand.  
 The demand factors presented above constitute the most important determinants 
of formal insurance demand. Further potential demand factors will be developed in 
the empirical specification in section 4.3. 
4.3 Data & Empirical Specification 
After outlining the rationale for an unconsidered source of basis risk induced by 
informal risk management and resulting income heterogeneity, the data and 
empirical specification will be presented in order to test the hypothesis that the 
degree of non-agricultural labor income has an effect on insurance demand. 
77 
The data set employed here is taken from the study of Cole et al. (2013). The cross-
sectional survey from the year 2006 covers a total of 1,047 land-owning households 
in Andhra Pradesh, India. Thus, every household perceives potentially a non-
negative amount of income stemming from agricultural activity. At the same time, 
income profiles of households under consideration display sufficient heterogeneity 
to analyze the impact of income heterogeneity on index insurance demand. After 
adjusting the data, a total of 893 households persist. 
In what follows, the empirical analysis tries to reveal further empirical evidence for 
the argument that careful risk and exposure assessment as well as a consistent 
design of underlying indices might be an appropriate solution to increase demand 
for index based microinsurance and to enhance the transition from informal to 
formal insurance solution. 
4.3.1 Drought insurance characteristics 
The drought-insurance product under study is marketed by the non-governmental 
organization BASIX and is sold by Livelihood Services Agents in villages in Andhra 
Pradesh, India. The product is underwritten by ICICI Lombard, an Indian financial 
service provider, which is well recognized. The product divides the Monsoon season 
into three phases of 35-45 days length each. Policies written on the first two phases 
cover the risk of lacking rainfall whereas the last phase policy covers excessive 
rainfall in the immediate pre-harvesting stage. Threshold levels have been 
determined using recognized crop growth models. Households willing to insure a 
whole Monsoon season therefore would have to buy three policies. The amount of 
rainfall and the payoff calculation is based on nearby governmental rainfall stations 
or automated rain gauges by an external operator (Cole et al., 2013). 
Figure 4-1 given below represents the indemnity function for the drought coverage 
phases.  
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Figure 4-1: Indemnity function of Phase 1&2 drought insurance8F9
The indemnity function is linear between the upper (strike) and the lower (exit) 
threshold level and increases in the amount of lacking rainfall for the first two 
phases of the Monsoon season. Thus, for every millimeter that rainfall falls short 
from the strike level, the contract pays a constant amount of INR 10 to the 
policyholder. Whenever rainfall undercuts the exit level, crop failure is sufficiently 
likely and the contract pays out a fixed amount of INR 1.000 per policy, but still 
irrespective of the individual loss experience of a particular farmer.  
Threshold levels have been calculated using crop growth models for the major 
production cash crops in the region, castor and groundnut (Giné et al., 2008). 
In the third phase of the Monsoon season, a policy pays INR 10 for every millimeter 
that rainfall exceeds the strike level and pays out INR 1.000 whenever rainfall 
exceeds the exit level (not shown in Figure 4-1 above). Contracts were designed 
such that one policy covers the risk of one acre of land. Average land holdings were 
about 6.31 acres. Combined premiums for all three phases of the Monsoon season 
ranged between INR 260 and INR 340 depending on the district of sale (Cole et al., 
2013)9F10. The payoff structure seems to be problematic as realized rainfall levels 
slightly above the exit level are significantly less indemnified than rainfall levels 
9 Source: Giné et al. (2008) 
10 The average income is equal to INR 59,656 (1,324 current US-$) per year. Maximum 
payout of INR 1,000  correspond to 22.20 US-$ (current), while the premium payment equals 
to INR 340 or 7.55 US-$ (current). Premium payments are thus equal to 0.57 % of the 
average annual household income.  
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slightly below the exit level although the probability of crop loss should not differ 
drastically. However, data does not allow controlling for the payoff structure in the 
empirical demand analysis. 
Households were free to buy any number of contracts to thereby adapt the coverage 
according to their rainfall risk. However, the demand variable is rather a binary 
variable. Almost none of the households purchased more than one contract. This 
provides evidence that households being unfamiliar with the product concept tried 
the product rather than insuring their risk adequately. According to Cole et al. 
(2013), 60 % of households bought Phase 1-contracts, providing coverage against 
lacking rainfall. 
To summarize, the product covers losses that are induced by rainfall variations. By 
construction, it entirely neglects income that is derived from non-agricultural labor 
market activity and is thus suitable to examine the hypothesis of wage-induced 
heterogeneous risk exposure as a factor impacting on insurance demand. 
4.3.2 Summary Statistics  
The objective of the study is to research the relationship between informal risk-
management and formal insurance demand with a particular emphasis on risk 
exposure. In this section, the summary statistics will be presented. 
Table 4-1 below depicts the summary statistics. The first column reflects the values 
for the entire sample whereas the second and third column differentiate between 
policy and non-policy holding households respectively. The fourth column depicts 
the significance levels of a two-sided t-test of mean differences between insured and 
non-insured households and column E reflects the expected effect on insurance 
demand probabilities. 
Drawing on the effect of risk exposure measured by the share of non-agricultural 
wages, it can be seen that among the insured households, the average share of non-
agricultural wages was lower (11% compared to 18 % among the non-insured 
households). Insured households relied to a larger extent on activities where rainfall 
determines productivity than non-insured households. Hence, there is descriptive 
evidence that risk exposure with respect to rainfall variability measured by the 
share of non-agricultural wages, has a negative impact on demand.  
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(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Full sample 
Insured
households 
Non-insured 
households 
t-test for 
mean 
differences 
Expected 
demand 
effect 
yrs_edu 3.93 4.14 3.83 + 
[Years of schooling] (4.819) (5.117) (4.686) 
hhsize 6.29 6.48 6.21 o 
[Household size] (2.846) (2.914) (2.815) 
muslim 0.02 0.02 0.03 o 
[Percentage share] (0.155) (0.148) (0.158) 
sexhead 0.94 0.95 0.94 o 
[male headed households, %] (0.230) (0.223) (0.233) 
age_head 48.83 49.16 48.69 o 
[Age of household head] (12.11) (12.11) (12.12) 
group_add 0.74 0.80 0.71 * + 
[Share of self-help group member] (0.619) (0.621) (0.617) 
riskav 0.56 0.52 0.58 *** - 
[Measure of risk aversion] (0.259) (0.268) (0.252) 
lcultirrpct 0.43 0.48 0.41 ** + 
[% share of irrigeable farm size] (0.434) (0.437) (0.430) 
d_highreward 0.31 0.65 0.16 *** + 
[Share of high reward receivers] (0.461) (0.479) (0.367) 
Electrified household 0.65 0.68 0.64 
[%] (0.478) (0.468) (0.482) 
inc_total 59,656.00 62,467.04 58,450.63 + 
[Household income, INR] (103,312.9) (94,512.9) (106,914.5) 
farm income share 0.42 0.44 0.41 
[%] (0.349) (0.346) (0.351) 
wsna 0.16 0.11 0.18 *** - 
[Share of non-agricultural wages] (0.292) (0.247) (0.307) 
ins_other 0.83 0.91 0.79 *** + 
[Share of households possessing other 
insurance products] 
(0.379) (0.291) (0.406) 
Observations 893 268 625 
Mean values, standard deviations in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 4-1: Summary statistics 
With respect to liquidity constraints, one can observe that among the insured 
households, 65 % had received a high random cash reward of INR 100 compared to 
16 % among the non-policyholders in exchange for a short training session on 
index-based microinsurance. In sum, 700 randomly chosen households of the 
sample received a random cash reward of either INR 25 or INR 100. Thus, the 
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descriptive analysis supports the previous literature in identifying liquidity 
constraints as decisive for insurance take-up. Cole et al. (2013) raise the concern 
that this could be due to a felt obligation of gift exchange: Those, who received a 
subsidy could have felt forced to buy a policy. Thus, in the subsequent analysis, total 
household income instead of the reward information will be used as a measure of 
liquidity constraints.  
Among those, who opted for insurance, the average risk aversion measure 10F11 
amounts to 0.52 whereas the same number equals 0.58 among the non-insured. This 
is basically in line with prior research that found a negative relationship between 
insurance demand and risk aversion and explained this by a lack of trust into 
insurers and products alike (Dercon et al., 2011, Giesbert et al., 2011, Giné et al., 
2008).  
Irrigation could be seen as a potential substitute for drought insurance. The 
descriptive data analysis provides a counterintuitive result: Among insured 
households, 48 % had good irrigation possibilities whereas the same number 
amounts to 41 % among those who are not insured.  
Further informal risk management factors and a potential informal risk 
management instrument is the number of household members. Households with 
more members have better abilities to sending out family members to other cities 
and places to thereby making use of their labor force. The data, however, provides 
counterintuitive evidence: Among insured households, the average family size 
equals 6.48 members, whereas the average non-insured household comprises 6.21 
members. Hence, it is expected that the family size does not have an effect on the 
insurance take-up decision. 
A positive demand effect is expected from product experience: Among those, who 
have drought insurance, 91 % percent of households had also experience with other 
insurance products, whereas 79 % of the households not having a drought insurance 
contract reported experience with this type of financial products.   
11 The measure of risk aversion has been constructed along the methodology of Binswanger 
(1980) and has been measured at the beginning of the Monsoon season 2006. Individuals 
choose from a menu of different lotteries that entail two different outcomes where the final 
payoff realization will be determined by a coin toss. The lottery is played against real money. 
Hence, a respective household trades expected payoffs against payoff variance, meaning that 
a higher expected payoff of a lottery is paid by a higher variance of the payoffs. The assigned 
value of risk aversion thus corresponds to the slope of that exchange function. Higher values 
thus indicate a higher degree of risk aversion. 
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Another factor that has been identified as a crucial determinant for the participation 
in financial markets is financial literacy. In the present study, descriptive data 
analysis reveals positive impacts of the general level of schooling as a proxy for 
financial literacy on insurance demand: Insured households show on average 4.14 
years of schooling whereas non-insured households experienced 3.83 years of 
schooling. As Cole et al. (2011) point out, equalizing financial literacy and school 
education might be inappropriate in the Indian context. Thus, Table 4-2 in the 
results section will present estimations using the level of school education as a 
proxy for financial literacy. Table 4-3 will then use an explicit measure of insurance 
skills where respondents have been asked to show that they understand the concept 
of probabilistic insurance in general. 
4.3.3 Empirical specification 
In order to test the hypothesis of risk exposure possibly impacting on insurance 
demand, a probit model in three different specifications will be estimated. As none 
of the clients purchased more than one contract, demand and coverage data coincide 
and the dependent variable is binary. The empirical models are specified as follows:  
Pr(𝑦 = 1|𝑋 = 𝑥) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑤𝑠𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽2 × 𝑑𝑓𝑟𝑔𝑖 + 𝑍 × 𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖         (6) 
Pr(𝑦 = 1|𝑋 = 𝑥) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑤𝑠𝑛𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽2 × 𝑑𝑓𝑟𝑔𝑖 + 𝑍 × 𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖       (7) 
 Pr(𝑦 = 1|𝑋 = 𝑥) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑤𝑛𝑎_𝑝𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽2 × 𝑑𝑓𝑟𝑔𝑖 + 𝑍 × 𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖    (8) 
where the dependent variable is a binary variable, taking on the value of 1 if the 
respondent had a drought insurance policy for at least one phase. Z is a 𝑛 × 𝑘 matrix 
of control variables and 𝛾 a 𝑘 × 1 vector of coefficients related to the control 
variables.    
Data does not allow distinguishing between different phase policies; whether the 
respondent bought drought or excessive rainfall cover. However, this is not seen as 
problematic as the argument of risk exposure holds for both cases of lacking or 
excessive rainfall. 
The variable 𝑤𝑠𝑎 –the overall wage share from agricultural and non-agricultural 
labor– is one measure of the risk exposure and is computed according to (9): 
𝑤𝑠𝑎𝑖 =
𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 
𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 + 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠
(9)
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By construction, the variable takes on values between 0 and 1.  
𝑤𝑠𝑛𝑎 –the share of wages from non-agricultural labor– is constructed in a similar 
manner and is given by (10):  
𝑤𝑠𝑛𝑎𝑖 =
𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 
𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 + 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠
 (10) 
Again, the variable takes on values between 0 and 1. The only difference with 
respect to (9) is that (10) only uses the amount of non-agricultural wages in the 
nominator. 
In a third specification, the level of non-agricultural wages per capita [𝑤𝑛𝑎_𝑝𝑐] has 
been included into the model. It is defined by (11):  
 𝑤𝑛𝑎_𝑝𝑐𝑖 =
𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
 (11) 
All empirical models specified by equations (6)-(8) contain a measure of 
conventional basis risk by including the distance from the rain gauge into the 
analysis [𝑑𝑓𝑟𝑔]. All models use clustered standard errors where clustering has been 
performed on the village level. The dataset contains data from 37 villages.  
With regards to the control variables contained in 𝛾, a measure of risk aversion has 
been integrated [𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑎𝑣] constructed along the methodology of Binswanger (1980). 
Higher values indicate higher levels of risk aversion. 
In order to control for the impact of budget constraints, the variable 𝑖𝑛𝑐_𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is 
integrated into the analysis which measures the overall income level stemming from 
farming and supplying time to labor markets.  
Trust issues have been integrated into the analysis in the following way: The 
variable 𝑖𝑛𝑠_𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 has been included, taking on a value of 1 if the household 
purchased also other insurance contracts. The fact that a household also purchased 
other insurance contracts signals that he understands and trusts this concept. 
Hence, awareness and trust are equalized and integrated into the analysis. 
In order to measure the degree of informal insurance coverage through self-help 
groups or communities as a potential substitute for formal insurance, the variable 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝_𝑎𝑑𝑑 has been included. It is constructed as a dummy variable and takes on 
the value of 1 if the respondent reported to be a member of a self-help group or 
community. On the one hand, it is questionable whether these self-help groups 
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indeed constitute a risk pooling across individuals. However, the fact that an 
individual is part of a social group is considered to be an indicator of whether the 
particular household is socialized or rather isolated and may receive help of any 
kind in the case of a loss event. Moreover, self-help groups are considered to enable 
information flows such that members could spread information about the 
advantages of insurance and thereby stimulate the insurance demand of other group 
members.  
Irrigation could reduce the vulnerability towards rainfall variations. Hence, 
irrigations and and drought insurance are considered to be potential substitutes, 
such that a higher share of irrigable area could lead to a lower probability of 
insurance purchase. Hence, the percentage of irrigable land has been included into 
the vector of control variables [𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑐𝑡]. It measures the percentage share of the 
overall farm size that can be irrigated.  
In order to account for imitation and peer effects, mean pay-outs on the village level 
of prior pilot study years in 2004 and 2005 have been integrated into the analysis as 
well [𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠].  
Further control variables comprise a measure of financial literacy, proxied by  the 
dummy variable [𝑑_ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢] taking on the value of 1 whenever school education of 
household heads is secondary school or higher. As there exist doubts whether 
schooling levels are a good proxy for financial literacy, an explicit measure of 
probabilistic insurance skills has been introduced in the estimation by integrating 
the variable [𝑖𝑛𝑠_𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙]. Respondents were asked to answer questions on the basic 
principles of index insurance, such as to determine whether they would receive a 
payout given a hypothetic rainfall level. The results for this estimation are reported 
in Table 4-2, again for all measures of income heterogeneity. 
4.4 Results 
Table 4-2 represents the estimation results and coefficients of the probit model 
estimation. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the household had at least one 
insurance contract. Column 1, 3 and 5 correspond to the equation (6), (7) and (8) 
whereas column 2, 4 and 6 depict the AME of the respective regressions. Risk 
exposure is modelled by the share of overall wage earnings in regression I or as the 
share of wage earnings that are not related to agriculture (Regression II) and in per 
capita terms (Regression III). 
85 
Table 4-2: Regression results I 
In regression (III), income heterogeneity has been modelled using the level of non-
agricultural wages per capita. All coefficients of income heterogeneity show a 
negative sign such that the likelihood of purchasing insurance decreases with the 
importance of wage earnings in household income, everything else held equal. 
However, only the coefficients of non-agricultural wages and per capita wages are 
significant on the five percent level whereas the overall wage share coefficient is 
insignificant. This could be explained by the fact that rainfall predicts productivity in 
(I) (Ia) (II) (IIa) (III) (IIIa)
ins_lev ins_lev ins_lev ins_lev ins_lev ins_lev 
Probit AME Probit AME Probit AME 
wsa -0.208 -0.0668 
(-1.15) (-1.14) 
wsna -0.383** -0.123**
(-2.05) (-2.04) 
wna_pc -0.0000350** -0.0000112** 
(-2.21) (-2.20) 
d_highedu 0.121 0.0389 0.139 0.0446 0.135 0.0433 
(0.91) (0.91) (1.07) (1.07) (1.03) (1.03) 
age_head 0.00495 0.00159 0.00506 0.00162 0.00488 0.00156 
(1.00) (1.00) (1.02) (1.01) (0.99) (0.99) 
riskav -0.423** -0.136** -0.437** -0.140** -0.458** -0.147** 
(-2.31) (-2.33) (-2.36) (-2.37) (-2.39) (-2.40) 
inc_total -0.000000239 -7.70e-08 -0.000000139 -4.44e-08 1.37e-08 4.38e-09 
(-0.51) (-0.51) (-0.28) (-0.28) (0.03) (0.03) 
ins_other 0.418*** 0.134*** 0.441*** 0.141*** 0.469*** 0.150*** 
(2.83) (2.90) (3.04) (3.12) (3.30) (3.40) 
dfrg 0.0110 0.00352 0.0135 0.00432 0.0137 0.00437 
(0.42) (0.42) (0.52) (0.53) (0.56) (0.56) 
mean_payouts 0.542* 0.174** 0.542* 0.174** 0.555** 0.178** 
(1.91) (1.99) (1.96) (2.04) (2.09) (2.18) 
lcultirrpct -0.0306 -0.00985 -0.0218 -0.00698 -0.0217 -0.00696 
(-0.30) (-0.30) (-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.21) 
group_add 0.0499 0.0160 0.0498 0.0160 0.0500 0.0160 
(0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (0.52) (0.52) 
Observations 885 885 885 885 893 893 
t-statistics in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable in all regressions is the dummy 
variable ins_lev taking on a value of 1 if the respondent had at least a policy for one Monsson phase. All regressions, 
except regression (Ia, IIa and IIIa) contain village dummies. 
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agriculture –self-employed or as a laborer– whereas there is no systematic 
relationship with the productivity of non-agricultural activities. Hence, there is 
empirical evidence that a higher wage share or per capita level of non-agricultural 
wages translates into a lower likelihood of purchasing rainfall insurance, everything 
else held equal.  
A household’s schooling level, measured in the dummy specification has a positive 
but insignificant effect on the demand decision. As the results stay unaffected 
whether schooling is measured in the dummy specification or using the years of 
schooling, the years of schooling specification will not be reported here. 
Risk aversion affects the likelihood of purchasing insurance in a negative way, 
holding everything else constant. Thus, the more risk averse a household is, the less 
likely he will be buying drought insurance. This effect is significant on the five 
percent level. Decreasing likelihood of insurance purchase in the degree of risk 
aversion is in line with prior research. It is argued that more risk-averse households 
are more cautious about the new concept of drought insurance. At the same time, 
the empirical results support the interpretation that more risk averse households 
engage more in informal risk management and are thus better protected, even 
without formal insurance. 
Trust into the concept of insurance increases the likelihood of buying drought 
insurance massively, measured by the variable 𝑖𝑛𝑠_𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟: Having other insurance 
products has strong and positive effects on drought insurance demand, everything 
else held equal. This result holds on any significance level and is in line with prior 
research.  
The affiliation to social groups is hypothesized to increase the likelihood of 
purchasing drought insurance (Cai et al., 2011). This is confirmed in the positive 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝_𝑎𝑑𝑑 coefficient. However, the coefficient turns out to be insignificant in any 
of the regressions.  
Prior pay-out experiences seem to be an important driver of insurance demand: To 
experience that the product triggers pay-outs in prior years and their magnitude 
have a strong inciting effect to buy the product. This has also been found by other 
authors in similar settings (Cole et al., 2014). Higher mean pay-outs in prior years in 
a village increase the probability of insurance demand to a large extent, everything 
else held equal. Furthermore, the effect is highly significant in all regressions. 
Therefore, positive pay-out experiences are considered to be one of the major 
drivers of insurance demand. 
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There is no empirical evidence that insurance and irrigation are substitutes as the 
coefficient of the variable 𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝑝𝑐𝑡 is positive, close to zero and insignificant on 
any significance level.  
Table 4-3: Regression results II 
Other effects that have been considered as important in the literature are liquidity 
constraints. In the specification of regression (I) through (VI), the total income level 
has been used as a measure of liquidity constraints. The related coefficients are 
(IV) (V) (VI)
ins_lev ins_lev ins_lev 
Probit 
(IVa) 
ins_lev 
AME Probit 
(Va) 
ins_lev 
AME Probit 
(VIa) 
ins_lev 
AME 
wsa -0.215 -0.0688 
(-1.21) (-1.20) 
wsna -0.380** -0.121**
(-2.03) (-2.01) 
wna_pc -0.0000339** -0.0000108** 
(-2.16) (-2.14) 
ins_skill 0.166*** 0.0531*** 0.168*** 0.0536*** 0.171*** 0.0545*** 
(2.63) (2.63) (2.63) (2.62) (2.68) (2.67) 
age_head 0.00475 0.00152 0.00474 0.00151 0.00454 0.00145 
(0.89) (0.89) (0.88) (0.88) (0.86) (0.86) 
riskav -0.366** -0.117** -0.382** -0.122** -0.401** -0.128** 
(-1.98) (-1.99) (-2.04) (-2.05) (-2.08) (-2.08) 
inc_total -0.000000247 -7.91e-08 -0.000000139 -4.43e-08 6.09e-09 1.94e-09 
(-0.53) (-0.53) (-0.28) (-0.28) (0.01) (0.01) 
ins_other 0.418*** 0.134*** 0.442*** 0.141*** 0.471*** 0.150*** 
(2.77) (2.86) (2.99) (3.09) (3.25) (3.37) 
dfrg 0.00337 0.00108 0.00550 0.00176 0.00578 0.00184 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) 
mean_payouts 0.312 0.0996 0.306 0.0978 0.317 0.101 
(1.07) (1.09) (1.06) (1.09) (1.14) (1.17) 
lcultirrpct -0.0449 -0.0144 -0.0334 -0.0106 -0.0320 -0.0102 
(-0.41) (-0.42) (-0.30) (-0.30) (-0.28) (-0.28) 
group_add 0.0652 0.0208 0.0657 0.0210 0.0669 0.0213 
(0.69) (0.69) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) 
Observations 885 885 885 885 893 893 
t-statistics in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable in all regressions is the 
dummy variable ins_lev taking on a value of 1 if the respondent had at least a policy for one Monsson phase. All 
regressions, except regression (IVa, Va and VIa) contain village dummies. 
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close to zero and insignificant such that it is concluded that liquidity constraints do 
not exert a systematic influence on insurance demand in this sample. However, if the 
reward variable is introduced as a measure of liquidity constraints, this exerts a 
positive and significant influence on the insurance demand. Despite the fact that 
Cole et al. (2013) emphasize that high cash rewards have been attributed randomly, 
the reward variable is negatively correlated with risk aversion. Due to concerns 
about multicollinearity, the doubts about a simple gift exchange and the enormous 
coefficient size, the variable is left out as a measure of liquidity constraints. 
Table 4-3 reports the estimation results with the modified measure of financial 
literacy. It can be seen that the direction of income heterogeneity effects on 
insurance demand remains unchanged. However, the estimation results confirm the 
conclusion drawn by Cole et al. (2011) that there is no systematic relationship 
between the schooling level and financial literacy. In our sample, the knowledge of 
probabilistic insurance increases the likelihood of purchasing drought insurance 
substantially, holding other effects constant. 
In order to take a closer look at the marginal effects, the AME at representative 
values of the variable of interest – the wage share of non-agricultural wages – has 
been plotted and depicted in Figure 4-2 below.  
It can be seen from Figure 4-2 that the positive marginal effect of higher mean 
payouts decreases as the share of non-agricultural wages increases. Hence, 
households that show a relatively higher degree of income diversification are 
decreasingly incentivized to buy drought insurance by observing higher mean 
payouts.  
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Figure 4-2: AME at representative values I 
 
A similar reasoning applies to the degree of risk aversion: The more the income 
portfolio is diversified, i.e. the share of non-agricultural wages increases, the more 
the demand decreasing effect of risk aversion tends to zero. Hence, comparing an 
individual that is fully employed in agriculture and an individual that perceives 80 % 
of income from non-agricultural labor, the demand probability is almost two 
percentage points lower with the latter, everything else held equal. 
Figure 4.3 depicts the same picture, now gradually changing the level of non-
agricultural wages per capita. The same observations can be made although the 
change in marginal effects is more pronounced. 
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Figure 4-3: AME at representative values II 
4.5 Conclusions 
The study presented here investigated the impact of income heterogeneity and risk 
exposure on index-based microinsurance take up. It was hypothesized that rainfall 
variability predicts agricultural productivity, whereas there is no systematic 
relationship with productivity outside of agriculture. Hence, individuals perceiving a 
higher income share from activities not related to agriculture are faced with a lower 
risk exposure towards variations in rainfall amounts and show therefore a lower 
correlation between income variability and index realizations. This lowers the 
possible return from buying index insurance and thus decreases the incentives to 
buy the product.  
The analysis has shown that formal insurance demand decreases as the degree of 
risk exposure decreases, where risk exposure towards rainfall variability was 
measured by the income share of non-agricultural wages. Using a dataset of 
smallholder farmers in Andhra Pradesh, there is empirical evidence for the 
mentioned hypothesis: The more income a household perceives from non-
agricultural activities, the lower is the probability that he purchases drought 
insurance, holding other effects constant.  
Other results of the existing literature in determining the demand for formal 
insurance were confirmed by the presented study: Risk aversion, trust and previous 
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payouts as well as income heterogeneity are the major drivers behind insurance 
demand. Financial literacy exerts a significant effect on insurance demand as well. 
However, equilibrating school education and financial literacy turned out to be 
inappropriate. 
In addition, there is empirical support for a further interpretation of risk aversion as 
a demand driving factor in insurance take up. Not only do more risk averse 
individuals trust less into insurance companies, but there is also evidence that risk 
aversion affects the decision to exert informal risk management positively. A higher 
degree of informal risk management reduces the incentive to buy formal insurance 
and thus results in lower take up rates.   
Policy implications can be drawn with respect to product design which should more 
carefully consider income generating processes and also the utilization of income. 
Index insurance works best where the income risk and the risk exposure is 
homogenous. What has been shown by the analysis is that diversified income 
structures lead to a decreasing demand probability. Hence, one potential solution 
would be to redesign index variables that trace income composition or usage more 
closely in order to increase the correlation between index and the income structure. 
This is being found if one looks at the expenditure side. Households in low income 
countries devote more important shares of their income on food consumption than 
households in developed countries. This is what has been formulated in the famous 
Engel’s Law. Hence, these households are particularly vulnerable for food price 
changes as this volatility may put the purchasing power of kind and cash income at 
risk: Food prices that suddenly increase devaluate income at hand that had been 
planned for food consumption. In addition, very few households reach food self-
sufficiency by their agricultural activity. Thus, it is suggested to modify the 
underlying index and to include measures of food price volatility in order to trigger 
indemnity payments.  If the objective would be to increase formal insurance demand 
by increasing the predictive power of the underlying index, this would be the logical 
implication.  
However, redefining indexes raises other concerns as local food prices are 
influenceable by local traders. Hence, future research should be concerned with the 
question, which level of measuring food prices is appropriate to reconcile the 
requirement of a non-influenceable index variable and a sufficiently high correlation 
with local food prices to predict purchasing power variations at the local level.  
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In order to make individuals participate in formal insurance schemes, this must be 
more beneficial compared to a situation where the individual conducts informal risk 
management. Products should therefore more appropriately target towards 
potential customers and be aware of the processes used to generate income. 
Redefining the index in the proposed way could be one potential solution to increase 
take-up for formal products.    
5 General conclusions 
The dissertation was concerned with the position of agricultural low income 
households in developing and emerging countries. It shed light on their role as 
“hedge fund managers” managing their risky portfolio of income generating 
activities, income threatening risks and the formal as well as informal management 
of these risks. 
The chosen approach was straightforward. In a first step, drought and food price 
induced risks and their effect on different household level outcome variables have 
been quantified in a broad review of recently published articles. The quantification 
of drought risks has shown that welfare effects are substantial in magnitude. While 
drought events affect all types of agricultural households equally negative, the 
conclusions with respect to food price volatility were multilayered: While rural 
producers tend to profit from increasing food prices in particular due to second-
round effects, poor urban net consumers with limited abilities to trade quality for 
quantity were the ones most negatively affected from variable food prices. More 
broadly speaking, poor households in urban and rural settings are usually on the 
losing side. 
In the following, labor market related risk coping strategies have been reviewed. 
Labor markets are an effective instrument to raise further income in the aftermath 
of a shock event. However, it is important to note that the shock absorbing power of 
labor markets depends on their structure, in particular on their degree of 
relatedness to agriculture as well as on the magnitude of labor demand and supply 
elasticities. While labor markets provide a certain degree of coping power, the time 
lag of wage adaptations might be substantial and thus reduce the coping power. 
Other risk coping strategies may have adverse consequences for low income 
households such as a reduced rate of human capital accumulation or losses in 
specialization. 
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The third chapter of the dissertation analyzed informal risk management in the form 
of labor time allocation where households under study split up their labor time 
potential over different income generating activities. The data set allowed 
distinguishing between farming and labor market activities. However, the labor 
market activities were not distinguished between agricultural and non-agricultural 
labor. The main result is that production and price risks affect the decision to 
allocate the labor time allocation. Farm production risk, modelled by the standard 
deviation of long-run rainfalls stimulated the time allocation towards the own farm. 
Thus, whenever the production risk increases marginally, households allocate more 
time resources towards own farm work. This counterintuitive result has been 
explained by the structure of labor markets: Labor markets are predominantly 
related to agriculture. Whenever production risks are more pronounced, labor 
demand falls. Hence, the only option for households to employ labor resources is to 
work on the own farm. The evidence with respect to food price variability was in 
line with theoretical considerations: An increase in the purchasing power risk 
induced by variable food prices decreased the amount of time allocated towards 
labor markets. This result was confirmed by subgroup analysis leaving out rice and 
wheat farmers from the regression and controlling for home consumption of 
produced agricultural goods. This risk-induced reallocation of resources leads to a 
concentration of time resources in agriculture. However, agricultural productivity is 
threatened by rainfall variability such that food price volatility emphasizes rainfall 
induced production risks and prevents households from diversifying their income 
portfolio. 
Chapter 4 of the dissertation was concerned with analyzing formal insurance 
demand by agricultural low income households and its relation with informal risk 
management activities. It was argued that households apply informal risk 
management by splitting up their labor time potential across farming, agricultural 
and non-agricultural labor. The resulting degree of informal protection affects the 
incentive to buy formal drought insurance as a household’s income profile is then 
individually susceptible towards rainfall variability. For instance, those households 
who earn relatively high income shares from non-agricultural labor should have 
fewer incentives to buy drought insurance as rainfall variability threatens a smaller 
share of their income portfolio. The analyzed household data set provided evidence 
in favor of that hypothesis and found a negative relation between the share of non-
agricultural wages and the probability of insurance demand.  
94 
It has been shown that it is of decisive importance to reconcile informal risk 
management strategies and insurance product design. Informal risk management 
has evolved over decades and formal insurance products have to fill the gap that 
was left over by the inefficiencies of informal risk management. If the objective 
would be to increase formal insurance demand, it has been argued that the 
indemnity determination mechanism of index-based drought insurance products 
needs to be modified to capture the income risk composition after informal risk 
management has been conducted. 
Formal insurance products have the advantage to give policyholders a right to claim 
compensation and not to beg for help in case of hardship. In addition, formalizing 
insurance has the potential to make crisis intervention more effective and to 
transfer more rights to the desperates. Moreover, formal insurance provides 
incentives for prevention and offers other positive side effects such as establishing 
precise data collection and management systems as well as developing technology 
and financial systems. What is essential is that formal insurance products have to be 
adapted to the specific needs of potential future customers. Conversations with 
practitioners revealed interesting insights: In particular, practitioners emphasized 
the importance of raising the take-up rate. A representative of a development 
agency told me about his positive and take-up increasing experiences by delaying 
premium payments and collecting them at the end of the agricultural cycle. By doing 
so, he claimed to raise take-up rates to a level of “75 %, and the remaining 25 % are 
a group you will never reach.”  Even though this seems to be an overwhelming 
success in terms of generating up take, this strategy is double-edged: Selling a 
product of which one is not sure whether it traces the income risk of the insured 
appropriately and achieving a high take-up by relaxing the budget constraints may 
create disappointment and anger among the insured when the income volatility 
prediction of the index turns out to be inappropriate. If an insurance product is 
supposed to be sold sustainably, one should focus on a high take-up and contract 
renewal rate instead of focusing on the take-up rate exclusively. A high contract 
renewal rate is achieved by an appropriate product design. Thus, one major aspect 
of this dissertation was to plead in favor of a consistent risk assessment and a 
careful product design before the formal insurance product is sold. It is a logical 
necessity to design the product such that it fits to the income risk structure in the 
best possible way. In a next step, one can add all kinds of marketing instruments 
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such as training and education sessions, delayed premium payments and other 
subsidies to push the product into markets.    
This dissertation has shown that informal risk management is the suitable 
instrument to cope with less severe risks and should therefore be anticipated in the 
product design of formal insurance products. The decision space of agricultural 
household management is not polarized between informal risk management on the 
one extreme and formal insurance demand on the other extreme. Instead of 
choosing one of the corner solutions, layering income risks and addressing them 
with appropriately designed risk transfer instruments as well as reconciling them 
with informal risk management strategies would be a much more effective and 
promising approach to reduce the burden of low-income hedge-fund managers.
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A Appendix A 
(I) (Ia) 
farm_days farm_days 
Pooled-OLS Pooled-OLS 
age 3.842*** 4.447*** 
(6.59) (7.04) 
age2 -0.0414*** -0.0473*** 
(-6.02) (-6.07) 
yrs_edu -2.946*** -2.657*** 
(-5.20) (-5.23) 
hh_size -0.494 -1.023 
(-0.75) (-1.53) 
farm_size 1.044* 1.299** 
(2.05) (2.24) 
cap_input 0.000250*** 0.000141 
(3.08) (1.70) 
irriare 22.23*** 18.26*** 
(4.71) (4.06) 
stdrain 13.49*** 14.69*** 
(18.13) (21.44) 
stdrice 0.0511*** 0.0750*** 
(3.60) (6.29) 
stdwheat 0.204*** 0.193*** 
(7.17) (7.48) 
consumption 0.00000163 0.00000122 
(0.75) (0.69) 
degab 37.82*** 36.53*** 
(6.17) (6.06) 
soilfert -0.343 2.277 
(-0.04) (0.31) 
male 41.59*** 42.13*** 
(3.86) (3.65) 
married 16.37*** 16.19*** 
(4.64) (4.70) 
mrkt_dist 2.203*** 0.105 
(4.31) (0.21) 
migration -40.14 -7.202 
(-0.85) (-0.15) 
Observations 8570 7829 
R2 0.334 0.341 
t- statistics in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 The dependent variable is the 
number of farm days per calendar year. All regressions, except regression (IIa),  contain village 
and year dummies. The constant has not been reported in the table. 
Table A-1: Complete regression results I 
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(II) (IIa) (III) 
lmpart lmpart work_days 
Probit AME Pooled-OLS 
age 0.155*** 0.0425*** 8.919*** 
(21.57) (20.76) (5.80) 
age2 -0.00185*** -0.000507*** -0.102*** 
(-24.13) (-23.48) (-6.36) 
yrs_edu -0.0126 -0.00344 4.775*** 
(-1.19) (-1.20) (4.46) 
hh_size 0.0115 0.00315 0.607 
(1.09) (1.08) (0.41) 
farm_size -0.0521*** -0.0143*** -2.270*** 
(-5.51) (-5.51) (-3.05) 
cap_input -0.000000583 -0.000000160 -0.0000425 
(-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.37) 
irriare -0.396*** -0.108*** -11.36* 
(-4.89) (-4.92) (-1.91) 
stdrain -0.0496 -0.0136 -16.44*** 
(-0.83) (-0.84) (-12.34) 
stdrice -0.00113*** -0.000308*** 0.0361** 
(-2.87) (-2.96) (2.38) 
stdwheat -0.000153 -0.0000419 -0.100** 
(-0.12) (-0.12) (-2.50) 
consumption 2.48e-08* 6.79e-09* 7.70e-08 
(1.89) (1.87) (0.03) 
degab 0.641*** 0.175*** 11.70 
(5.81) (6.50) (0.79) 
soilfert 0.0430 0.0118 1.857 
(0.25) (0.25) (0.20) 
male 0.608*** 0.167*** 25.13*** 
(4.64) (5.01) (4.36) 
married -0.168 -0.0461 -22.29*** 
(-1.29) (-1.28) (-2.97) 
mrkt_dist -0.0803*** -0.0220*** -0.370 
(-2.67) (-2.75) (-0.33) 
Observations 8054 8054 3816 
R2 0.193 
t-statistics in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is a dummy of labor market participation in 
column 1 and the number of labor market days for those who reported an active labor market participation in the last column. All 
regressions, except regression (IIa),  contain village  and year dummies. The constant has not been reported in the table.
Table A-2: Complete regression results II 
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B Appendix B 
(I) (Ia) (II) (IIa) 
ins_lev ins_lev ins_lev ins_lev 
Probit AME Probit AME 
exp_rain -0.0491 -0.0158 -0.0407 -0.0131 
(-0.50) (-0.50) (-0.41) (-0.41) 
d_highedu 0.121 0.0389 0.139 0.0446 
(0.91) (0.91) (1.07) (1.07) 
age_head 0.00495 0.00159 0.00506 0.00162 
(1.00) (1.00) (1.02) (1.01) 
muslim -0.172 -0.0553 -0.131 -0.0419 
(-0.81) (-0.82) (-0.65) (-0.65) 
riskav -0.423** -0.136** -0.437** -0.140** 
(-2.31) (-2.33) (-2.36) (-2.37) 
inc_total -0.000000239 -7.70e-08 -0.000000139 -4.44e-08 
(-0.51) (-0.51) (-0.28) (-0.28) 
hhsize 0.00103 0.000330 0.00146 0.000469 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) 
sexhead 0.0358 0.0115 0.0293 0.00941 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) 
ins_other 0.418*** 0.134*** 0.441*** 0.141*** 
(2.83) (2.90) (3.04) (3.12) 
dfrg 0.0110 0.00352 0.0135 0.00432 
(0.42) (0.42) (0.52) (0.53) 
wsa -0.208 -0.0668 
(-1.15) (-1.14) 
mean_payouts 0.542* 0.174** 0.542* 0.174** 
(1.91) (1.99) (1.96) (2.04) 
lculirrpct -0.0306 -0.00985 -0.0218 -0.00698 
(-0.30) (-0.30) (-0.21) (-0.21) 
group_add 0.0499 0.0160 0.0498 0.0160 
(0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) 
wsna -0.383** -0.123** 
(-2.05) (-2.04) 
Observations 885 885 885 885 
t-statistics in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable in all regressions is the 
dummy variable ins_lev taking on a value of 1 if the respondent had at least a policy for one Monsson phase. All 
regressions, except regression (Ia) and (IIa) contain village dummies. 
Table B-1: Complete regression results (Schooling level specification) 
XIV 
(III) (IIIa) 
ins_lev ins_lev 
Probit AME 
exp_rain -0.0335 -0.0107 
(-0.34) (-0.34) 
d_highedu 0.135 0.0433 
(1.03) (1.03) 
age_head 0.00488 0.00156 
(0.99) (0.99) 
muslim -0.121 -0.0386 
(-0.56) (-0.56) 
riskav -0.458** -0.147** 
(-2.39) (-2.40) 
inc_total 1.37e-08 4.38e-09 
(0.03) (0.03) 
hhsize -0.00192 -0.000615 
(-0.10) (-0.10) 
sexhead 0.0221 0.00706 
(0.12) (0.12) 
ins_other 0.469*** 0.150*** 
(3.30) (3.40) 
dfrg 0.0137 0.00437 
(0.56) (0.56) 
mean_payouts 0.555** 0.178** 
(2.09) (2.18) 
lcultirrpct -0.0217 -0.00696 
(-0.21) (-0.21) 
group_add 0.0500 0.0160 
(0.52) (0.52) 
wsa_pc -0.0000350** -0.0000112** 
(-2.21) (-2.20) 
Observations 893 893 
t-statistics in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The 
dependent variable in all regressions is the dummy variable ins_lev 
taking on a value of 1 if the respondent had at least a policy for one 
Monsson phase. Regression (III) contains village dummies which have 
not been reported. 
Table B-2: Complete regression results (Schooling level specification) 
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(IV) (IVa) (V) (Va) 
ins_lev ins_lev ins_lev ins_lev 
Probit AME Probit AME 
exp_rain -0.0260 -0.00831 -0.0176 -0.00561 
(-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.18) (-0.18) 
ins_skill 0.166*** 0.0531*** 0.168*** 0.0536*** 
(2.63) (2.63) (2.63) (2.62) 
age_head 0.00475 0.00152 0.00474 0.00151 
(0.89) (0.89) (0.88) (0.88) 
muslim -0.165 -0.0528 -0.120 -0.0384 
(-0.76) (-0.77) (-0.59) (-0.59) 
riskav -0.366** -0.117** -0.382** -0.122** 
(-1.98) (-1.99) (-2.04) (-2.05) 
inc_total -0.000000247 -7.91e-08 -0.000000139 -4.43e-08 
(-0.53) (-0.53) (-0.28) (-0.28) 
hhsize -0.000427 -0.000137 -0.000187 -0.0000596 
(-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
sexhead 0.0931 0.0298 0.0912 0.0291 
(0.50) (0.51) (0.50) (0.50) 
ins_other 0.418*** 0.134*** 0.442*** 0.141*** 
(2.77) (2.86) (2.99) (3.09) 
dfrg 0.00337 0.00108 0.00550 0.00176 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.21) (0.21) 
wsa -0.215 -0.0688 
(-1.21) (-1.20) 
mean_payouts 0.312 0.0996 0.306 0.0978 
(1.07) (1.09) (1.06) (1.09) 
lcultirrpct -0.0449 -0.0144 -0.0334 -0.0106 
(-0.41) (-0.42) (-0.30) (-0.30) 
group_add 0.0652 0.0208 0.0657 0.0210 
(0.69) (0.69) (0.70) (0.70) 
wsna -0.380** -0.121** 
(-2.03) (-2.01) 
Observations 885 885 885 885 
t-statistics in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable in all regressions is 
the dummy variable ins_lev taking on a value of 1 if the respondent had at least a policy for one 
Monsson phase. Regressions (IV) and (V) contain village dummies which have not been reported. 
Table B-3: Complete regression results (Financial literacy specification) 
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Table B-4: Complete regression results (Financial literacy specification) 
(VI) (VIa) 
ins_lev ins_lev 
Probit AME 
exp_rain -0.00876 -0.00279 
(-0.09) (-0.09) 
ins_skill 0.171*** 0.0545*** 
(2.68) (2.67) 
age_head 0.00454 0.00145 
(0.86) (0.86) 
muslim -0.112 -0.0357 
(-0.51) (-0.51) 
riskav -0.401** -0.128** 
(-2.08) (-2.08) 
inc_total 6.09e-09 1.94e-09 
(0.01) (0.01) 
hhsize -0.00312 -0.000995 
(-0.16) (-0.16) 
sexhead 0.0823 0.0262 
(0.46) (0.46) 
ins_other 0.471*** 0.150*** 
(3.25) (3.37) 
dfrg 0.00578 0.00184 
(0.23) (0.24) 
mean_payouts 0.317 0.101 
(1.14) (1.17) 
lcultirrpct -0.0320 -0.0102 
(-0.28) (-0.28) 
group_add 0.0669 0.0213 
(0.70) (0.70) 
wna_pc -0.0000339** -0.0000108** 
(-2.16) (-2.14) 
Observations 893 893 
t-statistics in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The 
dependent variable in all regressions is the dummy variable ins_lev 
taking on a value of 1 if the respondent had at least a policy for one 
Monsson phase. Regression (VI) contains village dummies which have 
not been reported. 
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